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SCIENTIFIC OPINION 
Scientific Opinion on the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza and its potential 
implications for animal health
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Analysis of the recent pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (pH1N1) virus indicates a probable origin in pigs. However, it was 
not reported in pigs prior to its detection in humans. Several cases of pH1N1 virus infections in animals have 
been reported, mainly in pigs but also in other animals including turkeys. Occasionally, pigs have been infected 
following exposure to pH1N1 infected humans. In pigs, a subclinical course was common and when clinical signs 
were seen (coughing, fever) they were generally mild. Presently, the clinical impact of pH1N1virus on the EU pig 
population is considered minimal. In poultry, outbreaks of pH1N1 have been reported only in turkey breeder 
flocks. So far, there is no evidence that pH1N1 virus is able to spread horizontally among turkeys. Awareness 
should be raised about the risk of infecting breeder turkeys with pH1N1 virus during artificial insemination. To 
date, no infection of wild birds with pH1N1 virus has been reported. From an animal health perspective, no 
specific disease control measures are considered necessary. Vaccines based on the pH1N1 virus appear to induce 
protection in swine similar to that induced by the existing swine influenza virus (SIV) vaccines. Such vaccines 
efficiently prevent disease by reducing virus replication in the lungs. However, voluntary vaccination of swine 
with these vaccines has not halted the circulation of SIV in swine. There is no urgency for vaccination of pigs 
against pH1N1 virus. Currently, no vaccines against H1 viruses for poultry are available but at present, there is 
no need to vaccinate poultry against pH1N1 virus. Monitoring of circulating influenza viruses in swine and 
poultry populations should be instigated to monitor the evolution of the pH1N1 virus including changes in 
virulence. 
© European Food Safety Authority, 2010 
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SUMMARY 
Following a request from The European Commission, the Panel on Animal Health and Welfare was 
asked to deliver a scientific opinion on the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza and its potential 
implications for animal health and thus:  
1. To assess the significance for the health of animals of different species (specially pigs and 
different poultry species) of the occurrence of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus in the EU 
and elsewhere; 
2. To assess the implications and consequences of the possible evolution of the pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 influenza virus on animal health; 
3. To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of disease control options such as establishing animal 
movement restrictions in protection and surveillance zones, culling of infected pig herds and 
contact herds for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus, as it is common practice for notifiable 
diseases, e.g. CSF, AI, FMD; 
4. To assess the risk that animals from a herd/ flock which was infected with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
influenza virus spread the virus after the last clinical signs of disease have been observed; 
5. To assess the possibility, efficacy and efficiency of vaccination, using existing vaccines or newly 
developed vaccines against pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus, in pig and poultry populations 
also in relation with possible evolution of variants of influenza viruses posing a serious risk to 
public and animal health; 
6. To assess the role of wildlife, in particular wild boar and wild birds in the epidemiology of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus, if any. 
Analysis of the recent pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (pH1N1) virus shows that it contains gene segments 
from pig, bird and human influenza viruses in a combination that has never been observed before. It 
appears probable that the pH1N1 virus originates from pigs, however, the pH1N1 virus has not been 
detected in pigs prior to its emergence in humans.  
In addition to human infections, several cases of pH1N1 virus infections in animals have been 
reported worldwide, predominantly in pigs but also in other animals including turkeys and cats. 
Occasionally pigs in the field have been infected following exposure to pH1N1 virus infected humans. 
Virus spread between and within herds has been observed, but the prevalence of pH1N1 in the swine 
populations worldwide is not known as no comprehensive epidemiological surveillance has been 
performed except in Norway.  
In field infections a subclinical course was very common, and when clinical signs were seen 
(coughing, fever), they were generally mild, the morbidity was low, and there was no mortality 
Pig to pig transmission passages with the pH1N1 virus have occurred but no increase in virulence of 
the virus has been observed, even in herds with naïve pigs.  
At present, the overall impact of pH1N1virus for the health of the EU pig population is considered 
minimal, and there is no indication that the situation is different elsewhere.  
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Pathogenic features of pH1N1 virus in experimentally inoculated pigs indicate that the infection is 
purely of a respiratory nature and shows a course similar to that of the endemic swine influenza 
viruses (SIVs) currently circulating in the swine populations worldwide. Thus, clinical signs, in 
experimentally infected pigs, are variable but relatively mild with fever, coughing and inappetence.  
In poultry, outbreaks of pH1N1 have been reported only in turkeys specifically in breeder flocks. The 
most likely cause of outbreaks in turkey breeder flocks is transmission of pH1N1 virus from infected 
poultry workers carrying out artificial insemination. Currently, there is no evidence that pH1N1 virus 
is able to spread horizontally among turkeys within a flock. Drop in egg production and decreased 
shell quality are the main clinical signs of pH1N1 virus infection of turkeys. 
Turkeys, chickens and ducks are refractory to experimental infections with pH1N1 virus via the 
respiratory tract. However, turkeys can be infected experimentally with pH1N1 virus by the 
intrauterine and intracloacal route.   
From the animal health point of view, no specific control measures against pH1N1 are considered 
necessary.  
The use of clinical signs as temporal proxy for termination of virus excretion within an infected 
epidemiological unit is of little value in either pigs or poultry. In these species the duration of virus 
excretion is not sufficiently associated with the appearance of clinical signs to allow epidemiological 
decision making based on their temporal order of occurrence. In consequence, using the time of 
cessation of clinical signs and a preset time interval at the level of epidemiological units to establish 
clearance from infectiousness (virus shedding) is lacking any scientific basis. 
Immunity resulting from vaccination of pigs with SIV vaccines existing on the European market will 
provide some extent of cross-protection against infection with the pH1N1 influenza virus but specific 
pH1N1 vaccines will offer superior protection. Such vaccines will significantly reduce or even 
completely prevent pH1N1 replication and disease in the individual animal.  
At present, from the available data, the epidemiological situation of pH1N1 in pigs does not justify 
their vaccination with pH1N1 vaccine. Vaccination on a voluntary basis will likely protect the 
vaccinated animals but it will not prevent the spread of the pandemic H1N1 virus in swine 
populations, unless sufficient proportion of farms coverage is reached.  
Currently, no vaccines against H1 viruses for poultry are available.  
Wild boar may be susceptible to pH1N1 but, if so, they are not expected to play any significant 
epidemiological role. No pH1N1 virus infections have been reported in wild boar or in wild birds 
despite the extensive surveillance programmes for influenza viruses conducted since the start of the 
H5N1 epidemic in poultry in 2004. 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
• Place strong emphasis on information to (a) increase disease awareness and (b) ensure that 
biosecurity is implemented to contribute to the reduction of potential spread of pH1N1 within and 
between animal units and also from humans to animals and back.  
• Awareness should be raised about the risk of infecting breeder turkeys with pH1N1 virus during 
artificial insemination. Specific guidelines should be developed to lower the risk of transmission of 
pH1N1 during AI. 
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• Clinical signs are not reliable as a basis to decide on the end of an infection with pH1N1 virus in 
an infected herd/flock because pH1N1 induced signs are variable, non-specific or absent. 
Therefore, when the health status in regard to excretion of pH1N1 virus from a farm/flock needs to 
be known, it is recommended to test a number of nasal/oro-pharyngeal swabs (swine) or 
oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs (poultry) according to the expected within herd/flock prevalence 
for pH1N1 virus by a specific pH1N1 PCR. Testing should start 14 days after the diagnosis is 
established and continue at 2 week intervals until no excretion of virus can be demonstrated. In 
pigs, the focus should be on animals of 8-12 weeks of age. 
• Inclusion of diagnostic procedures for the detection of pH1N1 might be considered in the event of 
the detection of non-notifiable influenza A viruses in existing syndromic surveillance programmes 
for H5/H7 in poultry to provide some baseline data should the virus change its tropism and 
pathogenicity for poultry. 
• There is no urgency for vaccination of pigs against pH1N1 virus. It could be useful, however, to 
have a specific vaccine, based on the pH1N1 virus, in case of change of the epidemiological 
situation of the virus in the pig population. 
• At present, there is no need to vaccinate poultry against pH1N1 virus.  
• Monitoring of circulating influenza viruses in swine and poultry populations should be instigated 
to obtain data to characterize the circulating influenza viruses for further evolution of the pH1N1 
virus including changes in virulence etc can be assessed. This information should be shared and 
analyzed together with similar information from the human health area. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH: 
• Available/stored swine influenza viruses detected in surveillance programs in a variety of countries 
in the ten years prior to the pandemic should be sequenced as far as possible to provide valuable 
scientific data that may improve understanding of the factors involved and led to the emergence of 
pH1N1. 
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BACKGROUND AS PROVIDED BY COMMISSION 
The present influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus is a new virus subtype of influenza A 
(H1N1) viruses that spreads from human to human and is causing a human influenza pandemic in 
accordance with the declaration made by the WHO on June 11 2009. 
The pandemic virus contains gene segments from pig, bird and human influenza viruses in a 
combination that has never been observed before. Apart from humans, the virus has also infected pigs 
in Canada, Argentina, Australia, Singapore (pigs from Indonesia), Norway, UK (Northern Ireland), 
the Republic of Ireland and Iceland and turkeys in Chile. The epidemiological situation appears to be 
in evolution. 
In contrast, the classical swine influenza viruses circulate widely in many pig populations around the 
world, including the EU. In relation to these viruses, a quite comprehensive monitoring programme 
has been ongoing under EU research programmes in the context of research on influenza viruses. 
Valuable experience in this regard has been made available through networks of expertise such as 
OFFLU and research initiatives under a specific call for avian and human influenza: Framework 6 
(FP6) Projects, FP7 Projects, and Preparedness and capacity building for emerging epidemics, swine 
focused projects like ESNIP2 and influenza network enhancing projects such as Flulabnet. The EU 
has been particularly active on research on human influenza. Some examples are FLUPAN which 
developed the first candidate H7N1 vaccine and NOVAFLU which developed the computer algorithm 
now incorporated by WHO in the vaccine strain selection process. 
There is no evidence suggesting that the novel virus behaves in pigs in a different way from the other 
classical influenza viruses of pigs that only cause a mild respiratory disease. 
As regards poultry, the pandemic influenza virus was identified in August 2009 in two turkey breeder 
holdings in Chile. The clinical symptoms had started in mid July with a sudden drop in egg laying and 
altered egg shells. No increased mortality was observed. Normal egg production was again reached 
after 20 days of the infection. The symptoms were very much alike an infection with an LPAI virus. 
By the time of the virus detection in turkeys there had been extensive human to human transmission 
of the pandemic influenza virus in Chile which makes occasional transmission from man to bird the 
most likely scenario. Some birds had been in contact with persons with respiratory disease. 
Genetic sequencing of the HA gene from the pandemic influenza virus isolated from the turkeys 
showed 99.5% similarity to the Californian human strain and a 100% match to the human strain 
currently circulating in Chile. Mutations that might explain an increased capability of the virus to 
infect turkeys have not been detected, but work to further characterise the virus is needed. No turkey-
to-human transmission has been reported so far. 
However, the finding of the pandemic influenza virus in turkey holdings in Chile is unexpected as 
attempts to date in the USA and Europe to infect turkeys experimentally with the pandemic influenza 
virus have been unsuccessful. The significance of the pandemic (HN) 2009 influenza virus for 
different animal species remains unclear. 
Surveillance for avian influenza is currently carried out in member States (MS) in poultry and wild 
birds. The objectives for AI surveillance are currently laid down in the official guidelines adopted in 
2007 by Commission Decision 2007/268/EC Surveillance in poultry aims in particular at detecting 
sub-clinical infections with LPAI of these subtypes thereby complementing other early detection 
systems, in order to determine genetic characteristics of influenza viruses and subsequently 
preventing possible mutation of these viruses to HPAI. It should be noted that surveillance for HPAI 
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H5N1 subtype virus in wild bird populations by testing live birds and those found dead has become 
more important to protect domestic poultry from becoming infected. 
In a longer term, there is a need for comprehensive monitoring of influenza virus genotypes to follow 
the state of play and the emergence and evolution of possible virus reassortants (virus monitoring) in 
pigs and other animal species, with the final aim to protect public and animal health. 
In order to limit the emergence and spread of influenza viruses with pandemic potential in an effective 
and proportionate way, the risk manager will require a better scientific understanding of influenza 
viruses and in particular of the underlying factors that most strongly contribute to the emergence on 
influenza viruses. It is also necessary to develop better methods and criteria to asses the risk such 
viruses may pose to people and animals. 
During recent years it has emerged that cooperation between public health and animal health experts 
from different fields such as virology and epidemiology is necessary to address such a complex issue. 
Furthermore, full and immediate sharing of research results and data between the scientific 
community and health authorities are essential to reap the full public health benefits of these research 
efforts. Scientific advice and risk assessment provides also for gathering and exchange of relevant 
information. 
In general the potential control measures to be taken in case of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza 
outbreaks or infection(s) in farms should be proportionate to i) the risk posed by animals, in particular 
pigs and different poultry species, in the transmission of the pandemic virus to humans, if any, 
compared to the role played by human-to-human transmission, and ii) the severity of the disease in 
animals and humans. 
From an animal disease control point of view it is considered that certain movement restrictions 
should be implemented for animal showing signs of influenza such as clinical respiratory illness. The 
main measure should be the movement controls of live animals to the other farms. The farm 
movement controls (quarantine) should be in place until a certain number of days (i.e. seven) after the 
last clinical signs of disease have been observed in the epidemiological unit and influenza is no longer 
considered a veterinary risk. 
Pre-existing immunity induced due to a previous influenza infection of following conventional 
influenza vaccination may not protect animals and specially pigs against the infection with pandemic 
influenza virus, but it is not excluded that it may provide partial protection. Partial protection has been 
observed in some experimental studies with piglets having maternal antibodies but not with sufficient 
challenge studies to provide confidence in these findings. Vaccines currently used in the EU or 
elsewhere to protect pigs against influenza may not be effective against the pandemic influenza virus. 
Therefore it is unclear weather vaccination is an appropriate tool to control pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
influenza virus in different animal species. 
As regards food safety, the statements made by the OIE/WHO/FAO/WTO/ ECDC/EFSA adequately 
address the issue of safety of meat such as pork and pork products for human consumption in relation 
to influenza. 
However, the Commission is in need of further scientific advice and risk assessment, as regards of the 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus in animals. 
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EFSA Reply letter 
Given that the original nine terms of reference (ToR) of the mandate were very comprehensive and 
also required different kinds of expertise, it was considered to be more efficient to split the mandate in 
two and to allocate the tasks to two working groups according to expertise and urgency. The first 
mandate, considered more urgent, dealt with this opinion replied to the six ToR presented below. The 
second mandate should cover those proposed ToR having a longer perspective 
5
will be dealt with 
separately. EMEA was invited to collaborate when responding to ToR 5.  
TERMS OF REFERENCE AS PROVIDED BY COMMISSION 
1. To assess the significance for the health of animals of different species (specially pigs and 
different poultry species) of the occurrence of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus in the 
EU and elsewhere; 
2. To assess the implications and consequences of the possible evolution of the pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 influenza virus on animal health; 
3. To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of disease control options such as establishing 
animal movement restrictions in protection and surveillance zones, culling of infected pig 
herds and contact herds for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus, as it is common practice 
for notifiable diseases, e.g. CSF, AI, FMD; 
4. To assess the risk that animals from a herd/ flock which was infected with pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 influenza virus spread the virus after the last clinical signs of disease have been 
observed; 
5. To assess the possibility, efficacy and efficiency of vaccination, using existing vaccines or 
newly developed vaccines against pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus, in pig and poultry 
populations also in relation with possible evolution of variants of influenza viruses posing a 
serious risk to public and animal health; 
6. To assess the role of wildlife, in particular wild boar and wild birds in the epidemiology of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus, if any. 
                                                     
 
5
  1.To indicate the most important factors to be monitored in animals that would suggest a risk of  emergence of 
a new pandemic influenza strain; 
    2.To assess possible options of monitoring for the presence of the most important factors that would suggest a 
risk of emergence of influenza viruses (potentially leading to a pandemic) in different animal populations, that 
could act as reservoir, mixing vessels or otherwise contribute to the risk posed to humans and animals by 
influenza viruses; 
    3.To assess the possible predictability of the emergence of a new pandemic influenza strain by monitoring the 
molecular evolution and development of influenza viruses in different animal populations. 
pH1N1 influenza and implications for animal health 
 
 
11 EFSA Journal 2010;8(9):1770 
ASSESSMENT 
1. Introduction  
Pigs are an important host in influenza virus ecology since they are susceptible to infections with both 
avian and human influenza A viruses, often being involved in interspecies transmission, facilitated by 
regular close contact with humans or birds. This cross species transfer of virus to pigs can lead to co-
infections involving swine, human or avian influenza viruses with subsequent opportunities for 
genetic reassortment (Kuiken et al., 2006; Olsen et al., 2006; De Vleeschauwer et al., 2009) of 
influenza A viruses and as a result new viruses can emerge. 
2. Origin and characterization of virus causing the pandemic (H1N1) 2009  
Phylogenetic studies of influenza A viruses have revealed species specific lineages of viral genes and 
have demonstrated that the prevalence of interspecies transmission depends on the animal species, the 
virus and its genetic characteristics. The molecular epidemiology of influenza viruses in pigs is 
complex with differences both at continental level (especially between Europe and North America) 
but also at regional level within continents. Genotypic characterisation of viruses is therefore essential 
to understand ecology and evolution of influenza viruses in different animal species and is central to 
determining the origin of new and emerging strains, such as pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (pH1N1) virus 
(pH1N1).  
Detailed analysis of early isolates of pH1N1 virus revealed that it closely resembled several viruses 
known to be circulating in pigs and that the initial transmission to humans probably occurred several 
months before recognition of the outbreak. Genetic analysis of each gene segment revealed that they 
derived from both North American and Eurasian swine lineages (Garten et al. 2009). The pH1N1 
contained a unique combination of gene segments that had not been previously reported. The 
neuraminidase and M gene segments derived from Eurasian swine viruses, that themselves evolved in 
pigs following the transmission of the „whole‟ avian influenza virus to European pigs in 1979 
(Pensaert et al. 1981). The haemagglutinin, nucleoprotein and non-structural gene segments derived 
from a classical lineage known to be contemporaneously circulating in pigs in North America. These 
classical swine viruses themselves were descendants of the 1918 pandemic H1N1 virus. These 
classical swine viruses underwent a series of reassortant events during the late 1990s and early 2000s 
in North America leading to a wide genetic diversity resulting in the so called swine „triple 
reassortant‟ lineage becoming established that comprised genes from both classical swine, avian and 
human viruses. These triple reassortant viruses derived PB2 and PA gene segments from avian viruses 
and PB1 from a human virus. The so called „TRIG‟ cassette of genes (PB1, PB2, PA, NP, M & NS) 
commonly found in these contemporary North American viruses (Zhou et al.1999) minus the M gene 
forms the backbone of the pandemic virus.  
In addition, pH1N1 shows genetic and antigenic distance in all gene segments of the virus, compared 
to contemporaneous strains (Smith et al. 2009). It has been postulated that the uncertainty in the 
phylogenetic estimate for the precise time of origin reveals a long period of un-sampled ancestry of 
swine viruses before the pandemic in April 2009 and could indicate reassortment of swine lineages 
may have occurred some years before emergence of the virus in humans (Smith et al., 2009). To date 
a single influenza virus from pigs has not possessed this unique genotype and so definitive evidence 
of the occurrence of this strain in pigs prior to the emergence in humans is still lacking. However, a 
virus containing seven out of eight genomic segments from the pH1N1 virus has been detected in a 
single 2004 isolate of H1N2 swine influenza from Hong Kong (Smith, et al. 2009).  
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In conclusion, therefore, on the balance of evidence an origin in pigs appears probable given the 
unique genotypic characteristics of pH1N1. Furthermore, there are pig populations in the world where 
contemporaneous circulation of American and Eurasian viruses does occur providing an opportunity 
for genetic reassortment in pigs. However, it should be noted that definitive evidence for the origin of 
pH1N1 in pigs may only be gained through analysis of viruses isolated from pigs and archived in the 
ten years prior to emergence of the pandemic.  
The aspects related to the surveillance of possible emerging influenza strains will be taken into 
consideration by the report replying to the second mandate.  
3. Description of the Pandemic H1N1  
3.1. Epidemiological overview of the pandemic in humans and likely scenarios 
After early outbreaks in North America in April 2009 the new influenza virus spread rapidly around 
the world. By the time WHO declared a pandemic in June 2009, a total of 74 countries and territories 
had reported laboratory confirmed infections. To date, most countries in the world have confirmed 
infections from the new virus. 
ECDC has been developing work in order to inform EU stakeholders of the likely scenarios for 
influenza transmission (pandemic and inter-pandemic) in Europe in the immediate future 
(2010/2011), with substantial input from its Advisory Forum, other European experts and WHO 
(“ECDC Forward look risk assessment for the 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) and future 
influenza season”, ECDC, March 2010). It has also identified the further information that needs to be 
gathered through surveillance and research in order to determine vaccine strategies. Observations, 
data, and other information were considered from a number of sources including prior pandemics, the 
European experience during this pandemic, sero-epidemiology, modelling and especially what 
happened in the Southern Hemisphere in 2009/10 following their initial autumn/winter wave. 
On the basis of the above, it seems unlikely that there will be another spring/summer pandemic wave 
in Europe unless there are significant unrecognised uninfected populations or the virus changes and 
becomes more transmissible. According to ECDC, serological surveys (measuring the levels of 
immunity in the human population) could help reduce this uncertainty. It seems highly likely that even 
when WHO judged the post-peak and post-pandemic phases to have been reached, Europe will 
continue to experience low-level transmission and small outbreaks of the pandemic pH1N1 influenza. 
This is the most likely scenario throughout the whole of 2010. On 10 August 2010 WHO announced 
that the H1N1 influenza virus has moved into the post-pandemic period. However, localized outbreaks 
of various magnitudes are likely to continue. However, larger outbreaks cannot be excluded given the 
lack of information from seroepidemiology. 
ECDC anticipates that epidemic transmission of the pandemic virus is highly likely in the next 
(2010/2011) winter season, at least in very young children and other susceptible individuals. It is also 
most likely that pH1N1will become the dominant virus in humans in the coming winter season along 
with influenza B viruses, though the presence of influenza A(H3N2) viruses as well cannot presently 
be excluded. By then Europe will probably be referring to this combination as the „new seasonal 
influenza‟. 
There is currently no evidence of increased virulence of the circulating pandemic influenza virus, 
however influenza viruses are notorious for their unpredictability and so this forward look risk 
assessment must not be seen as representing anything more than the most likely scenario. It will also 
be updated as relevant and significant data become available.  
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3.2. Cases of transmission reported between human and animals  
Several cases of pH1N1 virus infections in animals have been reported worldwide. These were 
predominantly documented in pigs but also incidentally reported from turkeys and cats (Hofshagen et 
al., 2009; Howden et al., 2009; Mathieu et al., 2010; Löhr et al., 2010; Pasma et al., 2010; Pereda et 
al., 2010; Sponseller et al., 2010; Song et al., 2010). Infections in other species (cheetah, ferrets and 
dogs) have so far been mentioned only in other media (meetings, internet). Table 1 summarizes the 
pH1N1 infections in different species that were officially recorded to the OIE and/or EU.  
Occasionally, pigs in the field have been infected following contact with humans showing influenza-
like symptoms. Influenza infections in these contact persons, however, which probably transmitted the 
infection to pigs, have only been laboratory confirmed in relative few individual cases, e.g. in 
Norway, Australia, United Kingdom, (Eurosurveillance, 2009, online). The zoonotic transmission of a 
virus from animals to humans is in this case reversed, which led to the term „reverse zoonosis‟ as a 
result of virus transmission events from humans to animals. It can not be ruled out that in addition to 
humans displaying clinical symptoms also subclinical infections in humans resulted in incidental 
infections in pigs. Furthermore, there is a report from Ireland about 2 veterinarians showing influenza-
like illness two days after sampling in a pH1N1 infected pig herd. Both have since been confirmed 
positive for pH1N1 virus (OIE, 2009, online). Currently comparative sequence analyses of pH1N1 
viruses detected in humans and pigs show very high homologies. Sequence analysis can at the 
moment give no additional information on the source of cross-species transmission of pH1N1 
between humans and animals in either direction. After introduction of pH1N1 into pig populations, 
pig to pig transmission seems to be the main route of virus spread (Reports on further transmissions of 
pH1N1 virus from humans to pigs are given in 4.1.2.1.). In addition, epidemiological investigations 
suggest humans (farm workers) as the likely source of pH1N1 infection in turkey breeder flocks (see 
section 4.2.2.).  
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Table 1: First Occurrence of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza infections in Different Animal Species 
Reported to the OIE and/or EU (until July 2010) 
Country Date of first 
notification  
Reported to Animal species ( number of herds/flocks;  
number of  cases for dogs and cats) 
    
Argentina 25/06/09 OIE Pig herd (2) 
Australia 31/07/09 OIE Pig herd (1) 
Canada 02/05/09 OIE Pig herd (several) 
 23/10/09 OIE Turkey breeding flock (1) 
Chile 21/08/09 OIE Turkey breeding flock (2) 
China (People‟s Rep. of) 17/12/09 OIE Pig herd (1) 
 17/12/09 OIE Dog (2) 
Chinese Taipei 05/11/09 OIE Pig herd (1) 
Denmark 11/01/10 OIE Pig herd (4) 
Finland 30/11/09 EU Pig herd (1) 
France 19/01/10 OIE and EU Turkey breeding flock (1) 
Germany 10/12/09 OIE and EU Pig herd (1) 
Iceland 27/10/09 OIE and EU Pig herd (2) 
Indonesia 26/11/09 OIE Pig herd (1) 
Ireland 29/09/09 EU Pig herd (2) 
Italy 04/12/09 OIE and EU Pig herd (4) 
 22/12/09 OIE and EU Cat (1) 
Japan 21/10/09 OIE Pig herd (2) 
Mexico 10/12/09 OIE Pig herd (1) 
Norway 12/10/09 OIE and EU Pig herd (around 80) 
Russia 24/12/09 OIE Pig herd (1) 
Serbia 27/01/10 OIE Pig herd (1) 
Thailand 17/12/09 OIE Pig herd (1) 
United Kingdom 18/09/09  OIE and EU Pig herd (19) 
USA 03/11/09 OIE Pig herd (1) 
 30/11/09 OIE Turkey breeding flock (1) 
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4. Influenza in animals 
4.1. Influenza in Pigs  
4.1.1. Epidemiology of endemic SIV in pigs in EU 
Influenza viruses of H1N1, H3N2 and H1N2 subtypes are endemic in swine populations worldwide, 
but there has been a clear genetic distinction between North American and Eurasian lineages of swine 
influenza viruses (SIVs) (Olsen et al., 2006). The predominant H1N1 viruses in Europe have an 
entirely avian genome and were introduced from wild ducks to pigs in 1979 (Pensaert et al., 1981). 
These “avian-like” H1N1 viruses have established a stable lineage and are currently co-circulating 
with H3N2 and H1N2 SIVs. The European swine H3N2 viruses contain haemagglutinin (HA) and 
neuraminidase (NA) genes similar to those of A/Hong Kong/68-like human influenza viruses, while 
the genes encoding internal proteins are of avian-like swine H1N1 origin. The dominant H1N2 viruses 
are considered triple reassortant viruses between a human H1N1 virus from the 1980s from which 
they obtained the HA protein, the swine H3N2 virus from which they obtained the NA and the avian-
like swine H1N1 virus, from which they inherited their internal genes (Brown et al., 1998). A 
serological survey study in unvaccinated sows in 2002-03 demonstrated high (≥30%) to very high 
(≥50%) seroprevalence to each of the 3 SIV subtypes in swine-dense regions of Belgium, Germany, 
Italy and Spain, except for a lower H1N2 seroprevalence in Italy (Van Reeth et al., 2008). In addition, 
most sows in these countries with high pig populations had antibodies to two or three subtypes. In 
Ireland, the Czech Republic and Poland, in contrast, H1N1 seroprevalence were lower (8-11.7% 
seropositives) and H1N2 and H3N2 antibodies were rare (0-4.2% seropositives). In North America, 
viruses of the classical swine H1N1 lineage were the dominant cause of influenza among pigs until 
the late 1990s. Beginning in 1998, H3N2 viruses with genes of classical swine, avian and/or human 
origin became established in the swine population. These viruses further reassorted with classical 
swine H1N1 viruses, leading to H1N2 and reassortant H1N1 viruses and resulting in a very complex 
picture (Vincent et al., 2008). Thus, the SIVs in Europe differ significantly in their antigenic and 
genetic make-up from those circulating in North America, while still other variants are circulating in 
various Asian countries (Brockwell-Staats et al., 2009).  
It should be mentioned, however, that surveillance for influenza in pigs is voluntary and inconsistent.  
4.1.2. Infections with pH1N1 virus in pigs 
Though the pH1N1 influenza virus is accepted to have emerged from pigs, it was not reported in pigs 
anywhere prior to its detection in humans. On the basis of phylogenetic analyses, it has been 
suggested that the virus must have circulated in pigs and its transmission to humans is the result of 
genetic events (Smith et al., 2009), the basis of which is not yet understood. This presumably one time 
transfer and adaptation to humans has resulted in a sustained chain of transmissions in humans 
leading to the 2009 human pandemic. Transmission to humans has been observed with several of the 
typical type A endemic swine influenza viruses (SIVs) such as H1N1 and H3N2, which have been 
endemic in swine populations for many years all over the world. However, this zoonotic feature has 
been expressed only very occasionally and has been observed in people in direct contact with pigs, 
most often through professional activities. Also, these swine viruses have failed to spread further 
between humans (Van Reeth, 2007; Van Reeth and Nicholl, 2009; Myers et al., 2007). So, the pH1N1 
virus has been exceptional in that it has shown sustained human to human transmission in contrast to 
the endemic SIVs. In addition the infection has also been transmitted to other mammalian species and 
poultry which support a rather unique biological feature of the pH1N1 virus.  
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The assumed pig origin of the pH1N1 virus has quickly stimulated researchers to perform virus 
inoculation experiments in swine using isolates obtained from infected humans and special attention 
has also been given to possible field infections on swine farms. Humans, especially those over 60, 
regularly have cross-reactive antibodies against pH1N1 while such cross-reactive titres were lower or 
undetectable in younger age groups before the start of the pandemic (Miller et al., 2010; Labrosse et 
al., 2010). The emergence of the pH1N1 virus in humans was thus rather visible especially in children 
and young adults. This epidemiological situation is different in swine where partial cross protection 
against the pH1N1 virus is demonstrated after infection or vaccination with SIVs such as H1N1 and 
H1N2 (see.5.1.1. and 5.1.2.). Therefore, contrary to the epidemiological situation in humans, disease 
outbreaks in swine will be less manifest and circulation of the pH1N1 virus in the swine population, if 
existing, may only be recognized by coincidence or after systematic and structured surveillance. 
The relatively few cases of pH1N1 virus infection in pigs in the field which have been reported 
worldwide, have offered the possibility to observe the impact of the virus on a limited basis and has 
raised questions on the possible role of pH1N1 virus infections for animal health and the possible role 
of the pig as source of zoonotic infections. 
In this section of the present report, attention will be given to the effect of pH1N1 in pigs in the field 
after reverse zoonosis and to pathogenetic aspects after experimental inoculation.  
4.1.2.1. Field infections in pigs including clinical signs and epidemiology 
Reverse zoonosis i.e. spread of H1N1 virus from infected humans to pigs has been reported. 
In the first stages of the pandemic in humans and when the first pig herds were infected, 
epidemiological data and field observations had shown that humans were the most likely source of the 
infection of pigs herds with no other sources of infection identified. However, from the phylogenetic 
point of view, the direction of transmission of the viruses isolated from pigs and humans was not 
definitely established.  
The first field infection in swine was diagnosed in Canada but such infections were later also reported 
in many different countries including Argentina, USA, Japan, Ireland, Iceland, Australia, Singapore, 
UK, Taiwan, Indonesia, Finland, Mexico, Germany, Denmark , Norway and others (see Table 1). In 
many of these countries, the infection in swine has been detected either by coincidence or via an 
epidemiological link when pig caretakers were ill with pandemic flu. Some cases were detected by 
surveillance or by suspicion and no link with ill persons was established such as in farms where pigs 
showed acute influenza like clinical signs despite previous vaccination against the endemic SIVs. 
Detailed reports of the clinical disease are often not given. An outbreak which occurred in Manitoba 
Canada in February 2010 and in which no epidemiological association with infected humans was 
described, can be given as example (Pig Progress, 2009, online). The pH1N1 virus infection was first 
suspected in a sow barn when sows that had been vaccinated against common strains of influenza, 
exhibited influenza-like symptoms and pH1N1 virus were identified as the cause. The herd where the 
virus has been diagnosed experienced a very mild disease with pigs showing only slight signs of 
respiratory illness, mild cough and nasal discharge, decreased feed intake and rectal temperatures up 
to 40.5°C. No deaths were reported and animals recovered without further problems within 4 to 7 
days after the onset of the illness. The infection subsequently moved to production units with nursery, 
feeder and finishing pigs. Biosecurity protocols were installed to reduce the possible spread into the 
barn and between barns and measures were taken to safeguard the health of pig producers and animal 
caretakers in the herd. It is interesting that the Canadian Food Inspection Agency agreed that farms 
where pigs have been diagnosed with pH1N1 virus infection do not require quarantine or culling of 
pigs. The reason was that the pandemic virus was  not considered to behave differently in pigs than 
pH1N1 influenza and implications for animal health 
 
 
17 EFSA Journal 2010;8(9):1770 
other influenza viruses commonly detected in swine herds and that there was  no evidence that pigs 
play a significant role in the spread of the virus in the human population. 
The introduction of pH1N1 virus in Norwegian pig herds is rather interesting since the Norwegian pig 
population has been, prior to this outbreak, free from H1N1 swine influenza viruses (Lium et al., 
2010).The first Norwegian report dates from November 12 (Hofshagen et al., 2009). In October 2009, 
coughing was observed in a sow in a pig herd of 85 sows and 850 growers and fatteners. No other 
signs were observed on the farm. A farm staff member had been ill with influenza-like symptoms 
diagnosed as pH1N1 before the pigs showed clinical signs. The pH1N1 virus was suspected and virus 
isolated from 12 of 20 pigs tested. Another herd in the proximity with only fattening pigs was infected 
soon thereafter presumably by an animal handler working on the first infected farm and this second 
infected herd was depopulated. Four more herds tested positive in the next few days. Surveillance 
programs were set up and, by the end of October, a total of 23 herds were found to be positive for 
pH1N1, 20 of which had confirmed or suspected contacts with humans with influenza-like disease 
while in 3 others the origin of infection was unclear. Clinical signs were described as moderate in 
some herds (fever, coughing) and mild to non-existing in others. According to the report (Hofshagen 
et al., 2009), all the initially infected herds had been in contact with humans with influenza like 
symptoms prior to the onset of disease in pigs. There was, in the early stage, no evidence of infection 
through pig-to pig contacts or fomites and the possibility of airborne infection was ruled out due to 
long distances between the first and the second round of infected farms. These observations therefore 
suggested that humans infected by pH1N1 virus were the likely source of infection for the pigs. 
In a  recently published  annual report by the National Veterinary Institute in Norway, in which the 
results of the 2009 national surveillance and control programme for specific viral infections in swine 
were presented, it was reported that a total of 20 swine herds were positive for antibodies against 
pH1N1 virus. Also, other 71 swine herds were positive for such antibodies in a targeted surveillance 
programme carried out between October 10 and December 31 2009 (Lium et al., 2010). These data 
show that pH1N1 virus, by the end of 2009, had become established in swine herds in Norway. The 
report stated that it remains to be seen whether the virus will become endemic in the Norwegian swine 
population. 
Recently, the clinical, epidemiological, and virological findings from the first three pig farms found to 
be infected with pH1N1 virus in England were reported in detail (Williamson et al., 2010). The truck 
driver was the suspected source of virus in a breeding farm which was detected first. Infected pigs 
from this farm appear to have introduced the virus into 2 nursing-finishing farms. The infection 
spread readily from one pig source to another and, in one of the 2 nursing-finishing farms, infection 
was detected for an 8 week period. Active infection in the first breeding farm was present over at least 
a seven-week period. These cases showed that pH1N1 virus, after its introduction, can indeed become 
established on pig farms and spread through movement of pigs. It remains to be determined by 
structured epidemiological surveys if the virus will become endemic in swine populations as a whole, 
and in different countries or continents.  
In conclusion, the impact of the infections with pH1N1 in pigs is difficult to assess in herds or regions 
where the endemic SIVs circulate and where vaccination against endemic SIVs is performed since 
cross-immunity and partial cross-protection are likely to occur. However, the outbreak in Norway in 
herds with naïve pigs has shown that pH1N1 infection in several herds was subclinical or showed low 
morbidity (e.g. only one sow with cough in the first detected herd). If clinical signs were seen, they 
were mild to moderate and characterized by fever and coughing. No mortality has been described. 
Similar observations were made in other countries (Williamson et al., 2010). 
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4.1.2.2. Experimental infection in pigs including clinical signs and virus excretion  
Six studies have been published in which pH1N1 virus was inoculated in pigs experimentally (Lange 
et al., 2009; Brookes et al., 2010; Weingartl et al., 2010; Itoh et al., 2009; Vincent et al., 2009, 2010a, 
b). Only three of the above studies refer to virus excretion (see Table 2).  Four of these have studied 
different pathogenetic aspects of the infection and will be discussed in more detail. 
In the study by Brookes et al. (2010) (Table 2) 4 to 5 week old pigs were inoculated by intranasal 
aerosol with the human California/0709 isolate and followed for clinical signs, virus dissemination 
and excretion. “In-contact” pigs were followed through 4 successive transmission cycles. Clinical 
signs were observed both in all inoculated and in all the contact pigs. They were generally mild (range 
mild to severe at the level of individual pigs), characterized by fever, nasal and ocular discharge, 
coughing, lethargy and inappetence. Clinical signs in individual animals lasted up to about 6-8 days 
post inoculation (dpi). Virus was detected by isolation in turbinates, nasopharynx, lung lobes and 
occasionally in respiratory associated lymph nodes but not in plasma, spleen, liver, kidney, ileum and 
muscle. Viral RNA was found consistently in nasal, ocular and oral swabs and rarely in faecal swabs. 
Titers and duration of viral excretion are given in Table 2. Nasal swabs in some animals were positive 
until 15 dpi. Contact animals maintained the virus during the successive cycles and their clinical 
signs, virus excretion pattern and profile of infection dynamics were similar to those of the directly 
inoculated pigs. These results indicate that pH1N1 virus would have the ability to become established 
in global pig populations particularly in immunologically naïve circumstances. 
The study performed by Lange et al. (2009) (Table 2) yielded results that were highly comparable to 
those of Brookes et al. (2010). Here, the human Regensburg/D6/09 pH1N1 isolate was inoculated 
intranasally in 10 week old pigs and naïve contact pigs were housed in direct contact. Clinical signs 
were mild, consisting largely of nasal discharge, sneezing and fever and lasted 4 days with a peak at 4 
to 5 dpi. Contact pigs became readily infected and showed similar signs of disease. Diarrhoea was 
observed in some inoculated and in some contact pigs but was not considered as being directly virus 
induced since pH1N1 virus was not shown to have intestinal tropism. Virus excretion was followed 
by RT-PCR and virus isolation. Oropharyngeal swabs were consistently positive and excretion lasted 
until 11 dpi in infected and contact animals as presented in Table 2. No viral RNA was detected in 
plasma samples. Lesions of bronchopneumonia were observed. 
In the Canadian study (Weingartl et al., 2010), (Table 2) 2 different pH1N1 isolates were used the 
human- derived Mexican isolate and the swine/Alberta OTH-33_2009 isolate which was obtained 
from pigs that had been infected in the field after contact with infected humans. Pigs were inoculated 
at 3 weeks of age either intranasally or intratracheally. With both isolates, inoculated animals 
developed mild clinical signs consisting of sneezing and transient increase in body temperature for 2 
to 3 days with much individual variation between animals. Virus excretion was followed by virus 
isolation and RT-PCR in nasal and pharyngeal swabs. Most pigs started to shed virus at 1 dpi and 
shedding lasted until 8 dpi by virus isolation and until 9 dpi by RT-PCR and no differences were 
observed between the 2 isolates (see Table 2).Virus was also demonstrated in lungs. The swine-
derived isolate was less frequently isolated from the lungs and at lower titres (peak titre 1.9 log 10 
TCID50 per 0.1 g) than the human-derived isolate (peak titre 5.7), whereas RNA copy numbers and 
numbers of viral antigen positive cells were similar for both isolates. It should also be noted, however, 
that conclusions about the differences in lung virus titres were based on 2-3 pigs only and that 
statistical evaluation was not possible. Blood, rectal swabs, muscle and submandibular lymph nodes 
were negative for viral RNA with both isolates. 
Other studies were carried out in the USA (Vincent et al., 2009, 2010a) with pigs inoculated 
intratracheally (age not mentioned) with either the human pH1N1 California or the human Mexican 
isolate at a dose of 2 X 5 log 10 TCID50. In a first study, pigs were euthanized at different intervals 
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until 7 dpi and examined for virus in tissues by virus isolation and RT-PCR (Vincent et al., 2009). 
Clinical disease was induced in all the pigs but no details were given. Virus was shown in lungs in all 
the pigs with both methods and in tonsils of only 2 out of 30 pigs by virus isolation only. The single 
extra-respiratory sample that tested positive by RT-PCR was the inguinal lymph node in only one pig. 
Serum, spleen, liver, kidney and muscle were negative in all animals. Viral shedding was not studied. 
In a second study (Vincent et al., 2010a), 4 pigs inoculated with A/California/04/2009 were 
euthanized 5 dpi for virological examinations of the same tissues as in the first study. All pigs 
developed clinical signs and elevated rectal temperatures beginning as early as 24 dpi and extending 
to 4-5 dpi. Clinical signs included lethargy, inappetence, and increased respiration rate and respiratory 
effort. Virus was first detected day 1, 2 or 3 pi, when both RT-PCR and virus isolation yielded 
positive results. Only samples from the respiratory tract (lung, tonsil, broncho-alveolar lavage fluid) 
tested positive by both RT-PCR and virus isolation. The inguinal lymph node from one pig and serum 
from two pigs were positive for viral RNA only. Macroscopic and microscopic lesions typical of 
influenza infection were seen in all pigs. 
In a very limited study (Itoh et al., 2009), miniature pigs were inoculated with the pH1N1 California 
isolate and it was only reported that efficient replication was observed in the respiratory tract and that 
no clinical signs were produced. 
The experimental inoculation experiments enable the conclusion that pH1N1 virus readily induces an 
infection of the respiratory tract in pigs inducing mild clinical signs which last, on the average, not 
longer than 3 to 6 days. Marked variation in clinical signs was observed between individual animals. 
Based on the group observations, clinical signs did not appear to differ after nasal-aerosol, intranasal 
or intratracheal inoculations but groups were rather small to make a solid evaluation and the results of 
individual pigs were not given.  Clinical signs and infection profiles were similar in “in-contact” 
animals compared to in directly inoculated ones. No mortality was observed and pigs recovered 
uneventfully. Pathogenesis studies showed that pH1N1 virus typically causes infection of respiratory 
tract tissues. The virus infects the entire respiratory tract including the lungs and induces broncho-
pneumonia. No infectious virus was detected outside the respiratory tract. Virus excretion was 
consistently detected in nasal, pharyngeal, oral and ocular excretions with highest values obtained for 
nasal swabs. Nasal excretion was most consistent and sustained and infectious virus was detected 
until 8 dpi in one study, and even until 11 dpi in another (see Table 2).  PCR was positive until 15 dpi. 
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Table 2: Duration (in days post inoculation) of clinical symptoms and Virus excretion as detected in 
various types of swabs after experimental infection of pigs with pH1N1 virus   
 
Study Age of pigs,  
inoculation 
route, 




 Virus excretion (methods and dpi) 















   oral PCR 1-7 1.5-2,0  REU 
   ocular PCR 1-13 0.5-1.0 REU 













et al. 2010 
3 wks 3 nasal (s) *** VI 1-7 5  TCID50 
 
 IN or IT  nasal (h) *** VI 2-8 5  TCID50 
 5.6  pharyngeal (s) VI 1-6 3.7  TCID50 
   pharyngeal (h) VI 1-6 4.5  TCID50 
   nasal (s) PCR 2-9 6-.5  
RNA copies 
   nasal (h) PCR 1-9 6.2 
   pharyngeal (s) PCR 1-6 4.5 
   pharyngeal (h) PCR 1-9 5-5.2 
IN: intranasal; IT: intratracheal; VI: virus isolation; PCR: real-time polymerase chain reaction; ND: not determined 
*inoculation dose in log10 TCID50 
**virus titres are expressed as log10 tissue culture infectious dose 50%(TCID50), amounts of viral RNA are expressed as  log10  
RNA copies or relative equivalent units (REU) 
***pigs were inoculated with pH1N1 isolates of swine (s) or human (h) origin 
 
 
4.1.3. Comparative aspects of pH1N1 virus infection and endemic SIV infections in pigs 
(particularly swine H1N1) 
A brief comparison is made between infections in pigs with the endemic SIVs and pH1N1 virus, 
based on the information presently available. It can be stated that the infection dynamics upon 
experimental inoculation are similar for all these viruses. All established subtypes (H1N1, H1N2, 
H3N2) and genotypes examined cause a typical respiratory infection with no tropism shown for extra-
pulmonary organs. Disease signs are mild and transitory. Several factors, even upon experimental 
inoculation, are known to influence the severity of disease such as route and dose of inoculation, age 
and physiological status of the animals. Intratracheal inoculation with a high virus dose (7 log10 
EID50) for example, results in more severe disease characterized by high fever for several days and 
difficult breathing in all the animals inoculated, which was not always the case in animals inoculated 
intranasally with a similar dose (De Vleeschauwer et al., 2009). Still, experimental inoculation 
experiments with pH1N1 virus (Weingartl et al., 2009) in young pigs showed that the infection course 
and disease were not different with two virus isolates administered either intranasally or 
intratracheally at a dose of 5.6 log10 TCID50. However, in this study, too few pigs were used to allow 
solid conclusions on disease severity. 
Pigs at the end of the fattening period have shown to be more severely sick than young pigs and 
weight loss can be considerable (reviewed by Olsen et al., 2006).   
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Also, from a pathogenetic point of view, both the endemic SIVs and pH1N1 virus have a similar 
strong tropism for all respiratory tissues issues including the lungs with virus production to similarly 
high titers. Excretion of both viruses mainly occurs via nasal excretions. However, in 2 studies with 
pH1N1, duration of such excretion lasted until 11 and 15 dpi, but was intermittent during the last 
days. In the study performed by Lange et al. (2009) virus was detected by RT-PCR and virus isolation 
in individual infected and in contact animals until 11 dpi whereas virus detection in the second study 
mentioned above was positive by RT-PCR until 15 dpi. Such a long period of virus excretion has not 
been described for endemic swine H1N1 virus where maximal duration of excretion has been reported 
up to 7 dpi (Van Reeth et al., 2006; De Vleeschauwer et al., 2009). More experimental data seem to 
be necessary to verify whether this reflects a real biological difference between the pandemic and 
endemic influenza viruses in pigs. Some of the investigations were performed in different 
laboratories. At least from the study descriptions no obvious methodological differences between the 
investigations performed with the pandemic and endemic influenza viruses do exist. 
Overall, infections with both types of H1N1 virus have a highly similar course in controlled 
experimental circumstances. 
The occasional pH1N1 virus infections described on pig farms in the field, presumably after reverse 
zoonosis, have been very mild even though different age groups were involved. Interestingly the 
Norwegian outbreaks occurred in a naïve pig population and remained moderate to mild to 
subclinical.  
Infections with endemic SIVs may sometimes be more severe under field situations, particularly in 
older fattening pigs and pregnant sows (reviewed by Olsen et al., 2006).  Fattening pigs, when 
experiencing a first influenza virus infection in the second half of the fattening period may be severely 
sick with fever, inappetence, coughing and severe dyspnoea. Secondary bacterial infections can then 
play a role in prolonging the disease and mortality of 2 to 3 percent can be encountered. Weight losses 
may amount to 5 to 6 kilograms.  Also, endemic SIVs may be part of the multi-etiological so called 
porcine respiratory disease complex in feeder pigs (Van Reeth et al., 1996). Sometimes, sows may 
abort (reviewed by Olsen et al., 2006), not because of possible fetotropic characteristics of SIVs, but 
very likely as a result of high fever. These severe influenza clinical signs or complications were not 
reported with pH1N1 in Norway.  
4.1.4. Infections with Pandemic Influenza in wild boar 
There is currently no knowledge on the prevalence of endemic swine influenza and pH1N1 viruses in 
wild boar. No experimental studies have been performed on the susceptibility of wild boar to pH1N1. 
4.2. Influenza in Poultry 
4.2.1. Epidemiology of Avian Influenza virus   
Avian influenza viruses can be divided in low pathogenicity or mildly pathogenic (LPAI) viruses that 
cause mucosal infection of respiratory and or enteric tract and highly pathogenic (HPAI) viruses that 
cause systemic infections. 
In poultry, LPAI viruses cause sub-clinical infections or mild respiratory disease. Decrease in water 
and feed consumption is another sign of infection but is only apparent when keeping consumption 
records. In egg laying chicken and turkey flocks, production losses can be severe or flocks never come 
to maximal production as is common in turkey breeders infected with swine-like influenza viruses 
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(Hinshaw et al., 1983; Mohan et al., 1981). LPAI infection may contribute to increase in daily 
mortality.  
All HPAI viruses described up to now all are of H5 and H7 subtype although not all H5 and H7 
viruses are of high pathogenicity. Sometimes LPAI H5 and H7 evolve into highly HPAI viruses. The 
mechanism which drives this evolution is unknown but probably is driven by stochastic events with 
increasing risk when these LPAI viruses are allowed to circulate in poultry. For this reason both LPAI 
and HPAI H5 and H7 viruses are notifiable. Control measures have been laid down in the Manual of 
Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines (OIE, 2009, online, Chapter 2.3.4.), the Terrestrial code of the OIE 
(OIE, 2009, online, Chapter 10.4.) and Council Directive 2005/94/EC (EU, 2005)
6
. Infections of 
influenza subtypes other than H5 and H7 are not notifiable. 
Most of outbreaks of LPAI viruses other than H5 and H7 have a limited spread, remained unnoticed 
or are not recorded (Alexander, 2006). Moreover, serological surveys that are obligatory in EU 
member states are directed at detecting H5 and H7 subtype viruses and generic tests that detect 
antibodies against all influenza A viruses can only be used when properly validated.  
Up to now humans have been infected with LPAI and HPAI H5 and H7 viruses and LPAI H9N2 
virus, (EFSA, 2008). H9N2 is now endemic in many countries in the Middle East and Asia and has 
been detected in pigs in China (Cong et al., 2004; Yu et al., 2008).  
4.2.2. Field observations including clinical signs and epidemiology 
Infection of poultry with human influenza viruses have not been reported before the emergence of 
pH1N1. Cases of infection of turkeys with H1N1 swine viruses have been reported in the USA 
(Mohan et al. 1981) and Europe (Andral et al., 1985; Ludwig et al., 1994). Infection of turkeys with 
swine, H1N2 (Suarez et al., 2002) and H3N2 (Tang, 2005; Choi et al., 2004; Pillai et al., 2009; 
Kapczynski et al., 2009) viruses were also reported. The clinical signs reported were drop in egg 
production and or respiratory symptoms and are similar to those found after infection of turkeys with 
LPAI viruses (Homme, 1970). Where infection of turkeys with swine influenza occurred, no major 
spread to other flocks was observed. Based on this knowledge it is not very surprising that infection 
with pH1N1 of poultry species in particular turkeys could occur after exposure to infected workers or 
pigs. However, up to now only cases of pH1N1 infections of poultry (all in turkey breeding flocks) 
have been reported in Chile, in Canada, in United States of America and in France. Infection of 
poultry with pH1N1 is not an OIE listed disease because it is not, at this time, a significant threat to 
poultry and therefore reporting of pH1N1 virus infections to the OIE is not obligatory although it 
should be reported as a new and emerging disease. It is unclear whether all countries do report pH1N1 
and therefore the actual number of outbreaks may be higher. 
On August 21, 2009 Chile reported two outbreaks of pH1N1 in turkeys. The outbreaks occurred on 
two farms housing turkey breeding flocks. The farms belonged to the same company, and were 
vertically integrated applying appropriate biosecurity measures. The first outbreak involved a farm 
with 5 breeding flocks comprising 29782 birds of which 24337 were reported affected. The outbreak 
started in flock no. 1 and reportedly through horizontal transmission, it reached 3 other flocks. The 
second outbreak involved a farm of the same company with 5 flocks. Egg production dropped by more 
than 50%. Egg shell quality was reduced also. The average morbidity was reported as 61.4% (81.7% 
for outbreak 1 and 41.3% for outbreak 2). The morbidity is based on the egg production and similar 
                                                     
 
6
 Council Directive 2005/94/EC of 20 December 2005 on Community measures for the control of avian influenza 
and repealing Directive 92/40/EEC, Journal of the European Union L 10, 14.1.2006, p. 16–65. 
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prevalence is found when serum samples were tested in the laboratory (Mathieu et al. 2010).  In the 
first outbreak neither respiratory signs nor increased mortality were observed. Necroscopy of the 
affected birds showed salpingitis, peritonitis and an interruption of the follicular development. No 
other lesions were observed. Samples of embryonated eggs collected at the hatchery scored negative 
in the real-time PCR. Twenty days after the beginning of the event, a recovery in the laying rate was 
observed. (http://www.oie.int/wahis/public.php?page=event_summary&reportid=8389). 
In Ontario, a grandparent turkey flock was suspected to be infected on October 9, 2009. The farm 
comprised two barns with in total 7,300 hens. In barn 1 the birds of 52 weeks of age showed a drop in 
egg production from about 1,800 eggs/ day, to about 300 eggs/day, a drop of about 80%. No spread to 
other farms was detected. A slight increase in mortality was also reported (about 10 birds over 3 day 
period) but it is stated that this increase may not be associated with the pH1N1 infections (OIE, 2009, 
online).  
In Virginia pH1N1 virus was detected in a turkey farm. Again the flock was investigated because of a 
drop in egg production on November 16, 2009.  The infection did not spread to flocks in the other 
barns of the farm (OIE, 2009, online). 
Also in France, a turkey flock showing a significant drop in egg production has been observed to be 
infected with pH1N1. The drop was observed starting on January 11, 2010. The morbidity was 
reported as 35% which probably is based on the number of animals that stopped laying (OIE, 2009, 
online).      
In summary, all outbreaks occurred in breeder flocks and a drop in egg production and reduced 
quality of egg shells seems to be the predominant clinical sign that was observed in the field. Where 
reported, the morbidity, estimated as the percentage of birds that stopped laying, varied between 35 
and 82% at flock level (OIE WAHID database). Other signs were not reported or could not be 
attributed to the infection with certainty. 
Epidemiological data of the outbreaks in poultry are scarce. Strikingly, in all cases breeding turkeys 
were involved suggesting that these type of birds are more susceptible or that handling practices 
unique to these type of flocks caused the outbreaks (i.e. artificial insemination). In most outbreaks it 
was assumed that turkeys were exposed to pH1N1 virus-infected workers. Investigation into the 
possible source of pH1N1 virus infection of the turkey flocks in Chile pointed to workers showing 
respiratory symptoms although none of the staff working on the farm reportedly showed clinical signs 
consistent with influenza like illness (Mathieu et al., 2010). Coincidently, in the week before the drop 
in egg production occurred, the peak of human cases of pH1N1 was recorded in the area where the 
infected poultry farms are located (in the epidemiological week 28).  The secondary spread to other 
flocks did not occur in Chile. However, both flocks were of the same owner.  Viral dissemination 
might have occurred either from the same infectious source, i.e., a farm worker or through fomites 
transported between premises (Mathieu et al., 2010). This view is compatible with high degree of 
homology of all genes of the Chilean turkey and human isolates. Complete genome sequences 
revealed similarity percentages ranging from 99.7% (PA, NP and M) to 100% (HA).  
4.2.3. Experimental infection in poultry  
Several groups addressed the question of the susceptibility of major poultry species to the pH1N1 
virus and performed challenge experiments with high doses (up to 10
6
 EID50) using turkeys (Swayne 
et al., 2009; Terregino et al., 2009; Russell et al., 2009); chickens, ducks and quails (Swayne et al., 
2009). The overall conclusions of all these experiments are that chickens and turkeys are not 
susceptible to infection via the nasal or oro-nasal route. Swayne et al. 2009 used turkey poults 3 
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weeks of age and reproductively active turkeys of 73 weeks of age. No virus could be isolated from 
swabs and none of the turkeys developed antibodies detectable in the HI test. Terregino et al. (2009) 
used turkeys at the age of 21 and 70 days of age. Birds did not shed virus but some of the younger 
birds did develop antibodies that were detectable in competitive antibody ELISA and the HI tests.  
To determine the virus pathotype, 4-week-old chickens were inoculated intravenously. The 
intravenous route of infection is routinely used to assess the pathogenicity of avian influenza viruses 
(OIE, 2009, online). None of the 4 week-old chickens that were inoculated intravenously died or 
developed disease indicating that the pH1N1 virus is not pathogenic for chickens. This is not a 
surprising outcome as none of chickens infected by the intravenous or intranasal route developed 
measurable antibodies suggesting that chickens are resistant to infection. In contrast one of the 
intranasally infected ducks developed an antibody titre of 1:16 in the HI test. Swabs collected from 2 
of 5 quails infected intranasally were positive in virus isolation at day 2 and all 5 at day 4 after 
infection and these quail seroconverted (Swayne et al., 2009). 
The field observation encouraged Pantin-Jackwood et al. (2010) to study whether turkeys could be 
infected via the intracloacal or intrauterine route. In these experiments the authors confirmed that 
turkeys were resistant to infection via the intranasal route but could be successfully infected via 
cloacal and intrauterine route. Birds did seroconvert and developed high antibody titers in the HI test. 
4.2.3.1. Clinical signs 
Infected quails showed heterophilic to lymphocytic rhinitis. Influenza virus was visualized by 
immunohistochemical analysis of epithelium and macrophages within the mucosa of the nasal cavity; 
but neither lesions nor antigen were detected in other respiratory and non- respiratory tissues. Infected 
ducks and chickens did not develop disease. The clinical signs reported by Terregino et al. (2009) in 
the 21 day-old infected turkeys could not be attributed with certainty to viral activity of pH1N1 virus. 
Turkeys infected via this intrauterine route stopped egg production at day 5 after infection and 
intracloacally from day 9 after infection. In contrast intranasal infection of turkeys had no effect on 
egg production or on the clinical condition of the infected birds. Virus was isolated from the oviduct 
and viral antigen was detected in ovary and luminal epithelium lining the oviduct (Pantin-Jackwood et 
al., 2010). 
4.2.3.2. Excretion of virus 
Virus excretion was not demonstrated in turkeys (Swayne et al., 2009; Russell et al., 2009; Terregino 
et al., 2009), or in chickens, or ducks infected intranasally (Swayne et al., 2009). All infected quails 
did shed virus via the respiratory tract at day 2-4 after infection at a mean titre of 0.9 log10 and 2.8 
log10 EID50/ml. However, the infected quails did not infect in contact naive quails through direct 
contact. No virus was isolated from and antibodies were not detected in the contact turkeys exposed to 
infected birds (Swayne et al., 2009, Russell et al., 2009) and quails (Swayne et al., 2009).  
When turkeys are infected via the uterus virus can be detected in oro-pharyngeal and cloacal swabs 
between day 2 to 14 after infection. In contrast only 1 bird that was infected intracloacally shed virus 
at day 4 only. Unfortunately, contact turkeys were not used and therefore we do not know whether 
virus shedding is contributing to the bird to bird transmission when considering the resistance of birds 
to infection via the respiratory tract (Pantin-Jackwood et al. 2010). In the field, virus was detected in 
swabs from turkeys for 2-4 weeks after egg production began progressively recovering in flocks 
(Mathieu et al., 2010).   
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The uterine and cloaca route of exposure is realistic in modern turkey production systems. Current 
breeds of male turkeys are unable to fertilise females by natural mating because of their large breast 
muscles. Therefore, female turkeys are inseminated once a week. For artificial insemination, workers 
pick up hens individually and to locate the vagina they expose the cloaca manually. The straw with 
semen is than introduced into the uterus. The whole process provides ample opportunities for 
initiating infection by either large droplet exposure during human sneezing activities or direct 
inoculation from infectious fomites on contaminated hands. Bird-to-bird transmission could occur 
through inserting contaminated instruments to the cloaca or reproductive tract by the inseminators. 
The observations are in agreement with observation in the field that outbreaks are only reported for 
turkey breeders and the limited secondary spread to other flocks or farms (Mathieu et al., 2010).  
4.2.4. Infections with Pandemic Influenza virus in wild birds 
Wild birds are the reservoirs of low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) viruses. These LPAI viruses 
can be transmitted to poultry, and from poultry to other domesticated animals and humans. To assess 
the risk posed by this wild bird reservoir for human and animal health, it is important to understand 
the ecology of avian influenza viruses. Therefore surveillance of wild birds is conducted in many 
regions (Munster, 2009). To date no infection with pH1N1 virus of wild birds has been reported 
despite several surveillance programmes that are conducted in wild birds in particular since the start 
of H5N1 epidemic in poultry in 2004. In any case, mammalian viruses (e.g. from swine, human and 
equine) have never been detected in wild birds, and therefore such a finding would seem exceptional. 
4.3. Infections with Pandemic Influenza virus in other species 
4.3.1. Infection with pH1N1             
Transmissions of pH1N1 virus presumably from infected owners to their influenza naïve indoor cats 
living in the same households have been reported (Sponseller et al., 2010; Loehr et al., 2010). Family 
members showed signs of influenza-like illness 4-6 days before the cats developed clinical signs. 
Infected cats developed disease signs of depression, inappetence and respiratory signs of 4 days 
duration. From the reports two animals developed fatal pneumonia (Löhr et al., 2010), the other 
animals recovered from the infection (Sponseller et al., 2010). Cats were of different age and showed 
a healthy status before the infection. No immunosuppressive virus infections (e.g. FeLV, FIV) have 
been documented in the affected cats as underlying infection which could have facilitated an 
increased likelihood for becoming infected. A rather limited study to estimate the prevalence of 
pH1N1 in cats was performed in France (Pingret et al., 2010). A total of 99 oropharyngeal swab, 
conjunctival swab, bronchioalveolar fluid and organ samples from cats displaying signs of upper 
respiratory tract disease and/or acute ocular disease were collected during the peak season of pH1N1 
in France and subjected to RT-PCR analysis. None of the samples were found positive.    
Similarly to the situation in cats, pH1N1 infections have also been detected in pet ferrets (Slavec et 
al., 2010). In nine animals clinical signs of dyspnea, naso-ocular discharge, sneezing, coughing or 
fever were observed for about 3 days. The pet owners showed clinical signs of influenza-like illness 
seven days before the animals became ill. Pharyngeal swabs, conjunctival swabs and nasal swabs 
from the pet ferrets were analysed by RT-PCR and found to be positive for pH1N1. All animals 
survived the infection. 
In a serological investigation for pH1N1 specific antibodies which included more than 964 sera from 
dogs collected just prior to or coinciding with the peak of the pH1N1 epidemic in humans in Italy in 
2009, 7 samples (= 0.7%) showed evidence of exposure to pH1N1 (Dundon et al., 2010).  
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As a first documented infection in wildlife animals the virus has been detected in two striped skunks 
in Canada (Britton et al., 2010). The animals developed severe fatal interstitial pneumonia. The 
source of the pH1N1 infection in these animals is unclear. Because the animals had frequent visits to 
a mink farm on which animals showed nasal discharge, transmission of pH1N1 from farm workers to 
minks to skunks is a possibility.  
Although not officially reported to public authorities and not yet published several additional Pro-med 
reports of pH1N1 cases in species like ferret, dog or cheetah and cats have been made public on the 
internet. These are summarized in Table in Appendix 1. 
So far no reports on experimental or natural pH1N1 infections in horses have been published.  
4.4. Evolution of Influenza  in pigs and poultry  
Successful cross species transmission of influenza viruses is dependent on both host and virus genetic 
factors and subsequent spread within the new host population requires a period of adaptation of the 
virus to the new host (Webster et al., 1992; Kida et al., 1994). The frequent transmission of human 
influenza viruses to pigs is well documented although the establishment of stable lineages is not 
always a consequence of such transmission (Brown, 2008; Klenk et al., 2008). However, the close 
contact between humans or birds and pigs facilitates interspecies transmission. The factors which 
fully govern whether these viruses can establish stable infection in pigs are unknown but it is likely to 
be multifactoral, dependent on both host and virus strain. In order to establish stable lineages, newly 
transmitted viruses need to be able to compete with viruses already endemic in the swine population 
and therefore by definition highly adapted to produce efficient infection and transmission. Host range 
is a polygenic trait with compatibility between gene segments in a given host cell. Successful 
transmission between species can also follow genetic reassortment with the progeny virus containing 
a gene constellation having the ability to replicate in a new host. Once the virus has successfully 
transmitted and been maintained within the global swine population, the long term endemnicity of the 
virus may be facilitated through the continual availability of susceptible pigs. The precise mechanisms 
whereby an avian or human virus is able to establish a new lineage in pigs remains unknown.  
The spread of human pandemic strains to pigs has occurred in three out of the last four pandemics 
including the present pH1N1. In 1918, the virus associated with the human pandemic H1N1 
transmitted to pigs and has been maintained to the present day (classical swine influenza). In 1968 
shortly after the appearance of H3N2 in the human population there was spread to pigs at a global 
level, showing many similarities to events that have occurred since the emergence of pH1N1 in the 
human population. Very rapidly, the H3N2 virus became well established in pig populations and 
continues to circulate widely at a global level, including contributing genes to frequent reassortment 
events leading to the emergence of new virus genotypes which have high efficiency for maintenance 
in pig populations.  
Presently, avian populations including poultry appear largely to provide a host barrier that restricts 
transmission of pH1N1 to such populations with relatively few occurrences of infection reported in 
contrast to other hosts such as pigs. In contrast to pigs, historically pandemic viruses have not been 
described in poultry populations and so adaptation and endemnicity with these viruses has not 
occurred. However, it should be noted that classical swine H1N1 viruses that have established stable 
lineages in North American pigs for nearly 100 years have been associated with frequent transfer to 
poultry populations especially including turkeys (Hinshaw et al., 1983). In addition, periodically 
spread of other subtypes from pigs such as H1N2 and H3N2 have been reported especially in North 
America (Suarez et al., 2002; Choi et al., 2004; Tang et al., 2005).  
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4.5. Evolution of Influenza viruses in some other species 
Although infections in species like cats and skunks have been published and additional infections in 
species like dogs, ferrets, and cheetahs have been reported in other media, the limited epidemiological 
data on cats (Pingret et al., 2010) and dogs (Dundon et al., 2010) currently suggest that pH1N1 
transmissions from humans to these animals and the further spread of the virus in these species does 
not often occur. Due to the limited efficiency of pH1N1 replication in these animals it seems unlikely 
that these animal species play a role in pH1N1 evolution.  
5.  Immunological response and Vaccines 
5.1. Pigs 
5.1.1. Immunological response against pH1N1 virus after infection with endemic SIVs.    
Experimental infection studies have shown that influenza naïve pigs are susceptible to the pH1N1 
virus and that the virus readily transmits between such pigs (Brookes et al. 2010, Lange et al. 2009).  
One crucial question, however, is whether prior infection with endemic European SIVs may offer 
some cross-protection against the pandemic virus. At the time of writing this report, there were no 
published data on the extent of cross-protection between enzootic European SIVs and the pandemic 
virus. But we can extrapolate from a recent experimental study in which pigs infected with a 
European avian-like H1N1 SIV showed a solid protection against intranasal challenge with a North 
American triple reassortant H1N1 SIV 4 weeks later (De Vleeschauwer et al., 2010). Most pigs tested 
negative for the challenge virus in nasal swabs and respiratory tissues, and none had lung lesions. All 
previously uninfected challenge control pigs, in contrast, showed nasal virus excretion during 6 
consecutive days, high virus titres in the entire respiratory tract, and macroscopic lung lesions. The 
pigs previously infected with the European H1N1 SIV lacked cross-reactive HI antibodies against the 
North American H1N1 SIV at challenge, but they had low levels of cross-reactive VN and NI 
antibodies. The pH1N1 virus closely resembles the triple reassortant virus used for challenge in this 
study, but it is more closely related to the avian-like H1N1 virus in its NA and M genes. It is therefore 
rational to expect an even more solid cross-protection against the pandemic virus than to North 
American H1N1 SIVs in response to prior infection with European H1N1 SIV. Very recently, 
Busquets et al. have examined the extent of protection against challenge with the human pH1N1 
isolate A/Catalonia/63/2009 in pigs experimentally infected with an avian-like H1N1 SIV 3 weeks 
earlier (Busquets et al., 2010). The challenge virus was undetectable in nasal swabs and lungs of these 
pigs by RT-PCR, whereas all challenge control pigs tested positive. This study shows that prior 
infection with an avian-like H1N1 SIV provided cross-protection against an infection with the pH1N1 
virus. 
Cross-protection has also been documented between European H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 viruses 
(Heinen et al., 2001; Van Reeth et al., 2003, 2006). These 3 virus subtypes show greater genetic 
heterogeneity in their HA than the European and North American H1N1 SIVs mentioned above. 
Consequently, infection with one subtype completely fails to induce HI and VN antibodies against 
another subtype. Still, experimental studies have shown a partial, though relatively weak, cross-
protection against any subtype in pigs previously infected with a serologically distinct subtype.  Nasal 
excretion of the challenge virus was on the average 2 days shorter in such pigs than in influenza naïve 
challenge control pigs. Furthermore, the extent of cross-protection increased dramatically if pigs were 
sequentially infected with two European SIV subtypes and challenge with the third, remaining 
subtype one month later (Van Reeth et al. 2006). These pigs were usually completely protected 
against nasal virus excretion. All these studies convincingly demonstrate that cross-protection 
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between SIVs with very distinct HAs a) can occur in the absence of cross-reactive serum HI antibody 
and b) strongly increases in pigs that have been exposed to multiple SIV subtypes.  
The occurrence of serologic cross-reactivity with the pH1N1 influenza virus after infection of pigs 
with European SIVs has been examined in more detail by Kyriakis et al. (2010a). They used sera from 
pigs that had been experimentally infected with a single SIV subtype, or with a combination of two 
SIV subtypes at a 4-week interval. The sera had been collected 3-4 weeks after the last virus 
inoculation and were examined in HI tests against a pH1N1 virus (A/California/07/09), and related 
North American H1 SIVs. Antibodies to the pH1N1 virus were undetectable after a single infection 
with European SIVs, but they were found in all dually infected pigs. Cross-reactive HI antibody titres 
were highest in the pigs that had been sequentially infected with H1N2 followed by H1N1 (20-160). 
These data suggest that pigs with infection-induced immunity to two European SIV subtypes may be 
at least partially immune against the pandemic virus. Conversely, the absence of cross-reactive HI 
antibodies in pigs that have been previously infected with only one European SIV does not mean that 
such pigs are fully susceptible to the pandemic virus, because an infection with influenza virus 
stimulates a complex and broad immune response, including serum antibodies as well as mucosal and 
cell-mediated immunity. The studies mentioned above further support the notion that a prior infection 
with SIV may partially protect pigs against an antigenically unrelated SIV in the absence of cross-
reactive serum HI antibody 
Additional evidence for broad serologic cross-reactivity with the pH1N1 virus in European pigs in the 
field comes from HI tests on 1,559 pig serum samples from 195 German pig herds collected from 
mid-June through mid- September 2009 (Dürrwald et al., 2010). Seroprevalence estimates for 
individual pigs were as high against the pH1N1 virus (52%) as against the avian-like H1N1 (53%) or 
H3N2 SIV (52%), compared to a 28% seroprovalence against H1N2. 
5.1.2. Immunological response and cross-protection against pH1N1 virus by inactivated 
vaccines based on endemic SIVs 
5.1.2.1. Characteristics  of existing SIV vaccines and their efficacy against endemic SIVs 
SIV vaccines in Europe have been licensed since the mid 1980‟s. All vaccines contain inactivated 
whole-virus or split antigens in combination with an adjuvant. Most vaccines are bivalent and contain 
older or more recent H1N1 and H3N2 influenza virus isolates. Since 2010 a trivalent vaccine 
including an H1N2 SIV has become commercially available. The protection offered by such 
inactivated influenza vaccines is almost entirely dependent on serum HI antibody titres, which are a 
recognized correlate of protection against challenge. Primary vaccination consists of two 
intramuscular injections 3 to 4 weeks apart and bi-annual booster vaccinations are recommended for 
sows. An essential difference between influenza vaccines for swine and those for humans is that most 
SIV vaccines contain potent oil adjuvants. Also, SIV vaccines are not standardized with respect to the 
substrates used for production (eggs versus cell culture), inactivation methods, antigenic content, and 
type of adjuvant. Furthermore, SIV vaccine strain composition differs in Europe and the US, because 
of antigenic and genetic differences in the circulating SIVs. Table 3 presents an overview of the 
composition of the commercial SIV vaccines in Europe. Unlike for the human vaccines, the strains 
included in the SIV vaccines have not been regularly updated. Antigenic drift is much slower with 
swine than with human influenza viruses. Experimental vaccination-challenge studies have shown that 
vaccines based on H1N1 and H3N2 antigens from the 1970‟s can still protect against SIVs from the 
late 1990‟s, if antibody titres against the challenge virus are sufficiently high (Van Reeth et al. 
2001a,b; Heinen et al., 2001). While there has to be antigenic overlap between vaccine strains of SIV 
and those circulating in the field, experimental data indicate that factors such as the antigenic content 
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and nature of the adjuvant may be more important for the potency of SIV vaccines than the choice of 
the vaccine strain (Kyriakis et al., 2010b). 
Most SIV vaccine efficacy data are from experimental vaccination-challenge studies in which SIV 
seronegative pigs are vaccinated twice with commercial vaccine and challenged with a virulent, 
usually heterologous SIV 2-6 weeks after the second vaccination. The pigs are challenged via the 
intranasal, aerosol or intratracheal inoculation routes. The typical clinical picture of SI, however, only 
results when pigs are inoculated with high virus doses (  7.5 log10 EID50) directly into the trachea. 
Studies with European SIV vaccines mainly used intratracheal challenge and lung virus titres as the 
major parameter to evaluate protection. Several studies have been performed with the first SIV 
vaccine on the European market, based on A/New Jersey/8/76 (H1N1) and A/Port Chalmers/1/73 
(H3N2). In studies with challenge viruses from the 1980s and 90s this vaccine could either completely 
prevent virus replication in the lungs and disease, or significantly reduce lung virus replication and 
thereby prevent disease (Vandeputte et al., 1986; Haesebrouck and Pensaert, 1986; Van Reeth et al., 
2001a,b). In a challenge study with a Belgian H1N1 SIV from 2007, the same vaccine conferred a 
suboptimal protection, whereas two out of 4 commercial vaccines examined significantly reduced 
virus replication in the lungs (Kyriakis et al., 2010b).  
Only one study has evaluated the effect of vaccination on virus excretion (Heinen et al., 2001). Pigs 
were vaccinated with the New Jersey- and Port Chalmers-based vaccine, and challenged by aerosol 
with an H3N2 SIV isolated in the Netherlands in 1996. Vaccination strongly reduced virus titres in 
oropharyngeal swabs: the challenge virus was isolated from only 2 out of 5 vaccinated pigs, at barely 
detectable levels, for 3 and 2 days respectively. In contrast, virus was isolated from all 5 unvaccinated 
control pigs during 4 to 6 consecutive days. The vaccinated pigs also failed to transmit the virus to a 
group of vaccinated in-contact pigs, but transmission from vaccinated to influenza naive pigs was not 
examined. 
In studies with US SIV vaccines, challenge was performed by the intranasal or intratracheal route. In 
contrast with the European studies, nasal virus shedding is one of the main parameters used to 
evaluate protection, next to clinical signs and lung pathology, whereas lung virus titres are only rarely 
examined. Still, independent studies with the same commercial monovalent H1N1 SIV vaccine and 
intranasal challenge with a classical H1N1 SIV from 1988 yielded conflicting results regarding nasal 
virus excretion. Excretion was undetectable in the study by Larsen et al. (2001), while there was only 
a 1-2 log10 reduction in the level of virus shedding in the study by Macklin et al. (1998). The latter 
findings were in agreement with the initial efficacy trials conducted by the vaccine manufacturer 
(Brown and McMillen, 1994), in which nasal virus shedding was prevented in only 50% of vaccinated 
pigs. Virus infection of the lungs, on the other hand, was undetectable in 95% of the vaccinated pigs, 
and clinical signs and macroscopic lung lesions were also reduced.  
Kitikoon et al. (2006, 2009) have performed experiments with 2 different bivalent US vaccines, in 
which the pigs were challenged intratracheally with the same classical H1N1 SIV from 1992. Virus 
titres in nasal swabs of vaccinated pigs were reduced with one vaccine (Kitikoon et al., 2009) and 
undetectable with the other (Kitikoon et al., 2006). Both vaccines reduced clinical signs and 
macroscopic and microscopic lung lesions. Lee et al. (2007) have compared the efficacy of 3 
commercial, bivalent SIV vaccines and an experimental homologous vaccine against challenge with 
an H3N2 SIV from 2004. Only the experimental homologous vaccine completely prevented nasal 
virus excretion. The suboptimal results with the commercial vaccines were ascribed to the antigenic 
heterogeneity of the challenge virus. 
 In summary, most experimental challenge studies with commercial SIV vaccines show a reduction or 
prevention of clinical signs, with reduced virus replication in the lungs and/or lung lesions. The effect 
on nasal virus shedding appears to be more variable, ranging from prevention of shedding to a 
minimal effect or no effect at all. Some studies suggest that inactivated SIV vaccines reduce virus 
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titres in the lungs to a greater extent than virus titres in the upper airways or nasal shedding (Brown 
and McMillen, 1994; Lee et al., 2007), whereas the reverse was found in other studies (Kitikoon et 
al., 2006). In several studies, nasal excretion of SIV was completely blocked in pigs that had been 
previously infected with live influenza virus, but not in vaccinated pigs (Heinen et al., 2001). This is 
in line with the fact that inactivated vaccines, in contrast to infection with field virus, fail to induce 
mucosal IgA antibody and induce serum antibodies only. Unfortunately, true comparative studies of 
virus replication in the lungs versus the upper airways of vaccinated pigs have not been performed.  
In the field the efficacy of SIV vaccination may be hampered by several factors: maternal antibody 
interference with vaccination, a short duration of vaccine-induced immunity, and insufficient 
antigenic match between vaccine and field strains.  
5.1.2.2. Cross-protection of existing SIV vaccines against pandemic H1N1 
The results of vaccination-challenge studies with the pH1N1 virus have been published for SIV 
vaccines available in North America. The H1N1 components in these vaccines differ from those in 
most European vaccines and they are more closely related to the pandemic virus. Vincent et al. (2009) 
have performed efficacy studies with the pH1N1 virus and 3 commercial SIV vaccines available in 
North America. The vaccines did not induce a complete protection, but 2 out of 3 reduced one or 
more of the parameters assessed, including clinical signs, lung lesions and challenge virus titres in 
nasal swabs or bronchoalveolar lavage fluids. The authors conclude that “Based on cross-protection 
demonstrated with the vaccines evaluated in this study, the US swine herd likely has significant 
immunity to the 2009 pandemic virus from prior vaccination or natural exposure.” 
As for the European SIV vaccines, challenge experiments with the pH1N1 virus in pigs vaccinated 
with European SIV vaccines have not yet been published. As mentioned, however, serum HI antibody 
titres induced by the vaccines correlate with protection against challenge, and cross-reactivity with the 
pandemic virus in sera from pigs vaccinated with European vaccines has been examined (Kyriakis et 
al., 2010a). The pigs had received a double intramuscular vaccination, with a 4-week interval, with 1 
of the first 4 vaccines listed in Table 3.  HI antibody titres against the pH1N1 virus and related North 
American SIVs (not further discussed) were determined in sera collected 4 weeks after the second 
vaccination. Two vaccines induced antibody titres ≥20 to pH1N1 virus in most pigs, which may 
protect against virus replication following challenge with SIV in pigs (Kyriakis et al., 2010a). Similar 
results were obtained in another experimental study in which sera collected 7 days after a double 
vaccination of pigs with commercial European SIV vaccines were examined in VN tests against the 
pH1N1 virus (Dürrwald et al., 2010). Most but not all vaccines induced antibodies against pH1N1, 
but not all pigs responded and antibody titres were lower than after vaccination with an experimental 
pH1N1 vaccine. Several studies point towards a major role of the adjuvant for SIV vaccine potency 
and serologic cross-reactivity with the pH1N1 virus (Kyriakis et al., 2010b; Dürrwald et al., 2010). As 
an example, a trivalent SIV vaccine with a carbomer adjuvant did not induce cross-reactive antibodies 
against the pH1N1 virus, whereas the same vaccine in combination with an oil adjuvant did. Both 
serologic studies indicate that some commercial SIV vaccines may offer some protection against the 
pandemic virus.  
5.1.3. Newly developed vaccines based on pH1N1 virus 
So far, a conditionally-licensed vaccine for pH1N1 influenza virus for use in pigs is available in the 
US but not in Europe (Rapp-Gabrielson et al., 2010). In Europe, two vaccine manufacturers have 
expressed the intention to develop a monovalent vaccine based on pandemic H1N1 SIV There are 
thus limited data about the efficacy of vaccines based on the pH1N1 influenza virus in pigs.  
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Vincent et al. (2010) have performed vaccine efficacy experiments with an experimental pH1N1 
vaccine in combination with an oil adjuvant. The pigs were challenged intratracheally (5.0 log10 
TCID50) with the prototype pandemic strain A/California/04/2009 3 weeks after the second 
vaccination. The vaccine provided complete protection in all parameters examined, including clinical 
signs, macroscopic and microscopic pneumonia, and virus isolation from nasal swabs and 
bronchoalveolar lavage fluid. The commercial vaccine available in the US has been shown to induce 
serum HI antibody titres ≥40, which are considered as protective, after a double vaccination of pigs 
(Rapp-Gabrielson et al., 2010). 
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Table 3: Commercially available SIV vaccines in Europe 
 
Manufacturer Product name Influenza virus strains 
Substrate for 
production 
Type of vaccine Adjuvant 
Antigenic content per vaccine 
dose 
Merial Gripovac 
A/New Jersey/8/76 (H1N1) 





H1N1: ≥ 1.7 HIU 
H3N2: ≥ 2.2 HIU 
Fort Dodge Suvaxyn Flu 
Sw/Netherlands/25/80 (H1N1) 






H1N1: 4 μg HA 










H1N1: ≥256 HAU 







MDBK* cells inactivated Carbomer 
H1N1: ≥ 107.0TCID50 
H3N2: ≥ 107.0TCID50 
H1N2: ≥ 107.0TCID50 
Hipra Gripork 
Sw/Olost/84 (H1N1) 






H1N1: 3 x 10
7
 EID50 
H3N2: 2.5 x 10
7
 EID50 
* MDBK: Madin-Darby bovine kidney; HIU: haemagglutination inhibiting units as determined by measuring the HI antibody response after the administration of the vaccine to pigs; HAU: 
haemagglutinating units before inactivation as determined in a haemagglutination assay with chicken red blood cells; TCID50: Tissue infectious dose 50% before inactivation; EID50: egg 
infectious dose 50% before inactivation 
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5.2. Poultry 
5.2.1. Use of vaccination and current availability of pH1N1 vaccines 
Vaccination of poultry against strains of influenza that do not fall under the definition of Notifiable 
Avian Influenza (OIE, 2009) or Avian influenza (EU, 2005)
7
 is not restricted and therefore technically 
and formally unregulated. Historically autogenous vaccines including viruses of the H6 and H9 
subtype have been used in poultry in Europe and in the US, particularly in turkeys and in laying hens. 
The use of these vaccines was generally limited to a time span in which viruses of the same subtypes 
were circulating in the field. 
Despite the occurrence of cases of H1N1 in turkeys between the mid „80s and „90‟s, vaccine to 
control this infection was never applied. The infection was self limiting and no additional intervention 
was foreseen. At the time of writing there appears to be no commercially available product against 
avian H1 viruses for use in poultry. In any case it would be surprising if avian-origin H1 viruses 
would afford protection against a swine-origin-human adapted virus such as pH1N1.  In this regard, 
data generated prior to the emergence of the pH1N1 virus, had shown no cross reactivity between 
avian H1 viruses and antibodies generated against human seasonal H1N1 virus in vaccinated  
individuals (Capua et al., 2009) using conventional tests.  
5.2.2. Vaccines against pH1N1 
Currently there is no vaccine based on pH1N1 virus for use in poultry in Europe. 
6. ToR 1 - To assess the significance for the health of animals of different species 
(specially pigs and different poultry species) of the occurrence of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 influenza virus in the EU and elsewhere; 
6.1. Pigs  
Considering the data presented on pH1N1 influenza virus infections in pigs in the previous sections of 
the report, both in experimentally inoculated pigs and in cases or outbreaks diagnosed the field, it can 
be concluded that disease signs with this pandemic virus are certainly not more severe than those 
observed with endemic swine influenza viruses (H1N1, H1N2, H3N2) presently circulating in most 
dense swine populations worldwide. Most reports of infections with pH1N1 virus in swine 
populations describe sporadic outbreaks. 
In Norway, however, where the swine population was naïve for SIV‟s, introduction of pH1N1 in this 
population has led to widespread dissemination. So far, no structured epidemiological studies have 
been performed in other countries or continents to determine its current prevalence.  
Experimental inoculation of pH1N1 in naïve pigs at the age between 4 and 10 weeks via different 
routes resulted in pathogenesis, infection dynamics and clinical signs (fever, inappetence, coughing) 
which are highly similar to those obtained with the endemic SIVs. The virus shows a tropism only for 
respiratory tissues and the infection is of pure respiratory nature with no direct involvement of other 
organs. 
                                                     
 
7 Council Directive 2005/94/EC of 20 December 2005 on Community measures for the control of avian influenza and 
repealing Directive 92/40/EEC. 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_010/l_01020060114en00160065.pdf 
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In the field, pigs have occasionally been infected apparently through contact with pH1N1 virus 
infected humans, and disease signs were either absent or morbidity was low. When signs were 
present, they were characterized by fever and cough and showed a mild to moderate course, even in 
herds with naïve pigs.  
No evidence of increase in virulence of the virus has so far been observed on a clinical basis in 
infected pig herds where the virus had spread throughout the herds despite the occurrence of 
numerous pig to pig transmissions. 
It remains to be seen if the pH1N1 virus will spread further in the swine population. The 
epidemiological behaviour of pH1N1 in the swine population is unpredictable as it may disappear as 
well as become endemic in the future. These observations are not only applicable for the EU but also 
for other parts of the world. If a previous infection or vaccination with endemic SIVs has a beneficial 
effect on the course of infection with pH1N1 virus in the field, such impact might not be the same in 
Europe as that in other parts of the world where other SIV subtypes circulate or are used as active 
components in vaccines, as will be explained further in ToR 5.  
6.1.1. Conclusions 
– At present, the impact of pH1N1virus for the overall health of the EU pig population is 
considered minimal. There is no indication that the situation is different elsewhere.    
– Influenza naïve pigs are fully susceptible to infection with human- or swine- derived strains of 
pH1N1 virus upon experimental inoculation and contact transmission among pigs readily occurs. 
– Pathogenetic features in pH1N1 virus experimentally inoculated pigs show that the infection is 
purely of respiratory nature and shows a course similar to that of the endemic SIVs currently 
circulating in the swine populations worldwide;  
– Clinical signs, in experimentally infected pigs, are variable but relatively mild with fever, 
coughing and inappetence.  
– Occasionally pigs in the field have been infected subsequent to exposure to pH1N1 virus infected 
humans. Virus spread between and within herds has been observed. 
– The prevalence of pH1N1 in the swine populations worldwide is not known as no comprehensive 
epidemiological surveillance has been performed except in Norway.  
– In field infections a subclinical course was very common, and when clinical signs were seen 
(coughing, fever), they were generally mild, the morbidity was low, and there was no mortality 
– Pig passages with the pH1N1 virus have occurred but no increase in virulence of the virus has 
been observed, not even in herds with naïve pigs. 
– Currently and since the occurrence in the field of pH1N1 virus infections in swine, there is no 
evidence of increased severity of influenza-like disease in European swine populations.  
– pH1N1 infections have, at present, not been reported in wild boar; wild boar are expected to be 
susceptible for pH1N1 infection as they are for the endemic SIVs but, similar to the situation for 
the endemic SIVs, they are not expected to play an epidemiological role in the infection in the 
domestic swine population 
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6.2. Poultry 
Considering the data presented on pH1N1 influenza virus infections of poultry in the previous 
chapters, both from experimental infections and field observation it can be concluded that except for 
turkeys and quails most poultry species currently are not susceptible to infection. Infection of turkeys 
and quails do not cause more severe disease than is observed with non-notifiable avian influenza 
viruses (OIE, 2009) of influenza. In turkeys loss in egg production and decrease in egg shell quality 
are the only signs which have only economical consequences for the producer. Successful 
experimental infection was only possible via artificial intra-uterine infection which however might 
explain that outbreaks only occurred in turkey breeder flocks. The uterus is exposed during artificial 
insemination which is routinely practiced in breeder flocks. Up to now there is no evidence that major 
between flock transmission of pH1N1 did occur and there is even doubt whether major within flock 
transmission does occur considering the outcome of infection experiments that show that turkeys are 
resistant to infection via natural routes. 
Although no extensive assessment has been performed, the current available data both from outbreaks 
and experimental infections do not show any mutations of pH1N1 leading to viruses that are more fit 
or virulent for poultry. 
6.2.1. Conclusions 
– In poultry, outbreaks of pH1N1 have been reported only in turkeys specifically in breeder flocks.  
– Currently, there is no evidence that pH1N1 virus is able to spread horizontally among turkeys 
within a flock.  
– Turkeys, chickens and ducks are refractory to experimental infections with pH1N1 virus via the 
respiratory tract which is considered to be a natural infection route for influenza A viruses. 
– Turkeys can be infected experimentally with pH1N1 virus by the intrauterine and intracloacal 
route.  
– The most likely cause of outbreaks in turkey breeder flocks is transmission of pH1N1 virus from 
infected poultry workers carrying out artificial insemination.  
– Drop in egg production and decreased shell quality is the main clinical sign of pH1N1 virus 
infection of turkeys. However, egg production and shell quality are not pathognomonic signs for 
pH1N1 infections and thus pH1N1 infections should be included in differential diagnosis of drop 
in egg production and decreased shell quality. 
– In oro-pharyngeal and cloacal swabs collected from turkeys experimentally infected via the uterus 
virus was detected for periods up to 14 days. In the field virus was detected in swabs from turkeys 
for 2-4 weeks after egg production began progressively recovering in flocks. 
6.2.2. Recommendations 
– Awareness should be raised about the risk of infecting breeder turkeys with pH1N1 virus during 
artificial insemination. Specific guidelines should be developed to lower the risk of transmission 
of pH1N1 during artificial insemination.    
6.2.3. Recommendations for future research 
– Studies to determine population dynamics of infection (among others transmission rate, 
reproduction ratio) in turkeys after infection with pH1N1 virus via the uterus. 
pH1N1 influenza and implications for animal health 
 
 
36 EFSA Journal 2010;8(9):1770 
7. ToR 2 - To assess the implications and consequences of the possible evolution of the 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus on animal health; 
In predicting the potential for long term evolution of the pH1N1 virus in pig populations it is relevant 
to parallel with similar events that have occurred historically after transmission of human pandemic 
strains to pigs. Some viruses have become established in pigs and undergone independent and parallel 
evolution to their counterparts in the human population and were maintained many years after the 
viruses were considered to have become a human seasonal strains. It can be expected that different 
host selection pressures will result in a different trajectory of evolution whereby changes in the gene 
segments, especially those encoding the external glycoproteins (HA and NA) will mutate at variable 
rates under different host selection pressures. Over time, this independent evolution, whilst enabling 
the establishment of host specific lineages of influenza viruses in pigs also results in considerable 
antigenic diversity whereby such viruses no longer resemble contemporary strains in the human 
population. This is well illustrated through the analysis of current H3N2 viruses whereby the strains 
that are maintained in the human population are antigenically distinguishable, being largely non cross-
reactive with the strains that are maintained in global swine populations. Strains of H3N2 subtype in 
global swine populations retain antigenic characteristics of viruses circulating in the human 
population in the early 1970s. Since antigenic drift has occurred in human strains at a faster rate 
compared to swine strains, these two host populations present separate reservoirs of virus that 
although of the same subtype, are very distinct. In reviewing potential outcomes and courses for 
pH1N1 in swine populations it would appear likely that the virus, if sustained in swine population, 
will be maintained independently of the human population and divergent evolution both genetically 
and antigenically would appear probable as long as the virus is maintained independently in both host 
populations. Evidence to date is one of frequent detection in pigs and already further reassortment of 
pH1N1 with endemic swine strains has been reported (Vijaykrishna et al., 2010). This pattern of 
evolution of virus in pigs through genetic drift and reassortment has occurred following previous 
pandemics in humans so might be expected to occur if pH1N1 continues to infect pigs.  Through 
selection, such strains appear to have increased fitness in pig populations whilst counterpart strains 
evolving in the human population are able to occasionally spill over to pigs but appear to be at a 
disadvantage compared to strains that may have established stable lineages within pig populations.  
7.1. Conclusions 
– At the time of this report, the pH1N1 has not changed its behaviour. Based on previous spread of 
pandemic virus to pigs, if pH1N1 continues to circulate in pigs, divergent evolution in pigs 
compared to those viruses in humans appears likely and there is no evidence that this will lead to 
the emergence of more virulent or zoonotic viruses.  
– It appears probable that the pH1N1 virus originates from pigs. However, the pH1N1 virus has not 
been detected in pigs prior to its emergence in humans and phylogenetic studies indicate that a 
reassortment of multiple lineages known to circulate in swine may have occurred within the last 
10 years. 
7.2. Recommendations 
– Inclusion of diagnostic procedures for the detection of pH1N1 might be considered in the event of 
the detection of non-notifiable influenza A viruses in existing syndromic surveillance programmes 
for H5/H7 in poultry to provide some baseline data should the virus change its tropism and 
pathogenicity for poultry. 
– Monitoring of circulating influenza viruses in swine and poultry populations should be instigated 
to obtain data to characterize the circulating influenza viruses from which evolution of the pH1N1 
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virus including changes in virulence etc can be assessed. This information should be shared and 
analyzed together with similar information from the human health area. 
– Monitoring of circulating influenza viruses in swine and poultry populations should be instigated 
to obtain data to characterize the circulating influenza viruses for further evolution of the pH1N1 
virus including changes in virulence etc can be assessed. This information should be shared and 
analyzed together with similar information from the human health area. 
7.3. Recommendations for future research 
– Available/stored swine influenza viruses detected in surveillance programs in a variety of 
countries in the ten years prior to the pandemic should be sequenced as far as possible to provide 
valuable scientific data that may improve understanding of the factors involved and led to the 
emergence of pH1N1. 
– Any incidental detections of pH1N1 in poultry should be subjected to genetic analysis and a good 
data flow ensured with ESNIP3 (a new FP7 project entitled „European swine network for 
influenza in pigs, 3‟) to monitor any change in virus characteristics and tropism. 
– The virus and host factors that contribute to the successful transmission and establishment of 
influenza A viruses in animal populations should be studied. 
8. ToR 3 - To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of disease control options such as 
establishing animal movement restrictions in protection and surveillance zones, culling 
of infected pig herds and contact herds for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus, as it 
is common practice for  notifiable diseases, e.g. CSF, AI, FMD; 
The terms “Effectiveness” and “Efficiency” of certain control options, as used in the ToR, were 
interpreted as follows: 
 An effective disease control option is a measure that contributes to the reduction of disease 
spread within and especially between units, i.e. results in reducing transmission and spread. 
 An efficient disease control option is a measure that results in reducing disease spread and in 
addition its use is feasible and proportionate to achieve the reduction in spread within and 
between units. 
8.1. Regulatory status for influenza in pigs including pH1N1 
At time of this report no harmonised control rules were laid down in the EU for control of influenza in 
pigs, and under current EU legislation for the reporting of infectious diseases in terrestrial animals 
(Council Directive 82/894/EEC)
8
 influenza in pigs (any strain) was not included. However, should the 
pH1N1 virus change its virulence resulting in (a) increased transmissibility and pathogenicity in pigs 
(with associated economic losses) or (b) significant new public health threat, then surveillance, 
protection and control measures may have to be taken. 
                                                     
 
8
 Council Directive 82/894/EEC of 21 December 1982 on the notification of animal diseases within the 
Community  OJ L 378, 31.12.1982, p. 58–62  
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8.2. Regulatory status for pH1N1 in poultry 
At time of this report pH1N1 outbreaks in poultry do not fall under Directive 82/894/EEC and are not 
subject to notification of animal diseases. Directive 2005/94/EC, however, will apply to surveillance 
of pH1N1 since a differential diagnosis for AI must be considered to determine whether H5 or H7 
influenza virus is involved. Official investigation and appropriate measures have to be applied on the 
holding until the presence of an influenza virus falling under the AI definition is ruled out through 
laboratory analysis (EU, 2005) and as recommended in the Commission guidance document 
(SANCO/6133/2009-Rev.6). 
8.3. Assessment 
In the light of the limited field data available, a cross-tabulation approach (Table 4) was used to link 
stages of diagnosis of pH1N1 in pig herds and poultry flocks (e.g. no evidence of disease, clinical 
suspicion, confirmation) to the set of control measures that are typically applied in the context of 
other infectious diseases such as CSF, FMD and AI (e.g. non-specific hygiene measures, diagnostic 
follow up, movement restrictions, culling and vaccination activities (cf. guidance documents 
SANCO/6133/2009-Rev 6 in poultry and SANCO/6211/2009 Rev.7 in pigs). For the control 
applications, these measures are combined to achieve control success, since single measures usually 
have only the capacity to reduce transmissions (of pH1N1) within or between herds by limited extent. 
The assessment, evaluations and resulting conclusions are based on  
• the epidemiology of pH1N1 virus infection as known at the time of this report; 
• the assumption that the epidemiology of pH1N1 virus infection in pigs and poultry will not 
undergo substantial changes in the near future; 
• the animal health perspective, i.e. excluding the zoonotic component of pH1N1; and 
• the main principles of efficacy, proportionality and flexibility of measures. 
8.3.1. Method of evaluation of control measures 
The preventive and control measures, as applied with notifiable diseases, were identified (columns of 
Table 4).  
Each control measure was evaluated for the particular diagnostic stages (rows of Table 4)  
• firstly, whether it would contribute to the reduction  in spread of pH1N1 virus (Part A); and  
• secondly, whether, in addition to the former, its application would be feasible and 
proportionate in the context of pH1N1 (Part B).  
Results of both evaluation procedures were tabulated separately (Table 4 Parts A and B).  
The evaluation was discussed and discrepancies clarified. The discussion refers to Sections 4 and 5 of 
this report as scientific background as well as the aforementioned working documents of the 
Commission. 
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8.3.2. Results of evaluation of control measures 
Table 4: Cross tabulation of the evaluation of the outcome of measures applied in control schemes for 
notifiable diseases (columns) at different diagnostic stages for pH1N1 infection (rows).  
 
The table comprises two parts. In Part A (“Effective”), it was considered whether the individual 
measure could contribute to the reduction in spread of pH1N1 virus within and between poultry and 
pigs units at the particular diagnostic stage. In Part B (“Efficient”), it was considered whether the 
individual measure works well in reducing disease spread and, in addition, whether it is feasible and 
proportionate to apply it in the context of a pH1N1 infection. 
Part A: Effective































































































































































































































































































































































No suspect cases of pH1N1
General surveillance (disease awareness) situation, no 
flock/herd-based supicion
Suspicion of pH1N1
Presence of suspicious clinical symptoms indicative of 
pH1N1 (such as egg drop or coughing)
Confirmation of infection
No clinical symptoms, but pH1N1 antibody detection
Laboratory confirmation of pH1N1-related „outbreak“  
(virus detection)
General activities Detection, first Intervention Control without 
vaccination
Control with vaccination
Although in Part A all measures can contribute to some extent to the reduction of spread, even of unconfirmed pH1N1 
infections, it was decided to grade the shading of cells. Darker colour was applied to indicate more likely impact (e.g. 
after virus confirmation), while a lighter colour indicates less importance (e.g. with a suspicion only). Blank cells 
indicate no practical relevance of the measure when there is no evidence of pH1N1 outbreak. 
  
Part B: Efficient
















































































































































































































































































































































No suspect cases of pH1N1
General surveillance (disease awareness) situation, no 
flock/herd-based supicion
Suspicion of pH1N1
Presence of suspicious clinical symptoms indicative of 
pH1N1 (such as egg drop or coughing)
Confirmation of infection
No clinical symptoms, but pH1N1 antibody detection




General activities Detection, first Intervention Control without 
vaccination
Coloured cells indicate measures that contribute to reduction of spread, and are also feasible and proportionate. Blank 
cells represent measures perceived as not feasible or proportionate. Horizontally hatched cells represent control actions 
enacted due to legislation in cases of unspecific influenza suspicion in poultry (2005/94/EC) which were not considered 
proportionate in response to only a pH1N1 suspicion. The diagonally hatched cells in the bottom rows indicate a 
measure considered feasible to protect the production system after pH1N1 confirmation but not as sufficiently 
proportionate.  
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Table 4 Part A indicates that most of the measures applied in the context of notifiable infectious 
animal diseases were considered able to contribute to a reduction in transmission and thus to reduce 
spread of pH1N1 within and between pig or poultry units.  
General hygiene measures such as voluntary isolation (separation, quarantine) of newly introduced or 
sick animals or “all-in all-out” procedures would certainly reduce the risk of introducing / spreading 
pH1N1 within and between units. Limiting access of humans that might be infected with pH1N1 
should also minimize reverse zoonotic transmission and thus (human-based) introduction of the virus 
into susceptible flocks. 
According to Table 4 Part B, only the general hygiene measures were considered both useful for 
reducing spread of pH1N1 infections and also as feasible and proportionate in their use.  
Culling of   infected herds/flocks will reduce spread of the infection from the identified outbreak farm 
and indeed, if applied at the diagnostic stages prior to pH1N1 confirmation the measure will perform 
equally well in reducing spread from actually infected units. However, at the time of writing this 
report, such measures were not considered proportionate for use in controlling pH1N1 (hence marked 
as not efficient in Table 4 Part B).The reasoning was based on scientific evidence that pH1N1 
infection does not induce substantial clinical signs or economic losses in pigs (Chapter 4.1), and the 
lack of scientific evidence that pH1N1 infection can lead to direct transmission between poultry 
(Chapter 4.2),  
Furthermore, Table 4 Part B indicates certain exceptions which are marked by horizontally hatched 
cells although the indicated measures are not directly related to preventing spread of pH1N1. Since a 
differential diagnosis to AI must be considered in the case of an influenza virus suspicion in poultry 
(Directive 2005/94/EC), a diagnostic follow up of suspect cases in poultry including movement 
restrictions of the flock under investigation (mandated by AI regulation for differential diagnosis/ 
exclusion) has to be enacted. 
Moreover, after the presence of pH1N1 is confirmed within a flock / herd, voluntary (industry agreed) 
movement restrictions could be considered feasible to protect the production system (diagonally 
hatched cells) but not as sufficiently proportionate to be highlighted for application against pH1N1. 
During the discussion it became obvious that evaluating feasibility and proportionality of most 
measures was strongly related to management aspects and that evaluation was influenced by the minor 
impact of pH1N1 infections in pig and poultry populations, as detailed in Chapter 4-5 of the report 
and specifically in response to ToR1.  
8.4. Conclusion 
– From the animal health point of view no specific control measures against pH1N1 are considered 
necessary at all.  
– Measures similar to those jointly used to control notifiable animal diseases (such as CSF, FMD 
and AI) were all expected to contribute to some extent to a reduction in spread of pH1N1 
infections. However, at the time of writing this report, only general hygiene measures were 
considered proportionate and feasible to be used to reduce virus spread during pH1N1 outbreaks. 
– Diagnostic follow up of suspect influenza cases in poultry including movement restrictions of the 
flock under investigation is mandatory but only due to required differential diagnosis to H5 / H7. 
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8.5.  Recommendations 
– Place strong emphasis on information to (a) increase disease awareness and (b) to ensure that 
biosecurity is implemented to contribute to the reduction of potential spread of pH1N1 within and 
between animal units and also from humans to animals and back.  
9. ToR 4 - To assess the risk that animals from a herd/ flock which was infected with 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus spread the virus after the last clinical signs of 
disease have been observed; 
In existing control schemes, e.g. for diseases with decisive and standard clinical signs,  a specific time 
interval  following the last detection of clinical signs in an infected epidemiological unit is proposed 
as the (best available) predictor for the end of virus shedding at  the level of the epidemiological unit. 
The ToR refers to the question whether such a “waiting” period after disappearance of clinical 
symptoms could be defined for pH1N1 infections after which   it can be safely assumed that virus can 
no longer spread from the epidemiological unit. It specifically addresses the recommendations made 
in two working documents from 2009 in which for poultry [SANCO/6133/2009-Rev.6] and for pigs 
[SANCO/6211/2009 Rev.7] farm-level quarantine/movement controls should be maintained until at 
least seven days after the last clinical signs of disease have been observed in the epidemiological unit 
and influenza is no longer considered a veterinary risk. 
It is known that influenza infected individuals are infectious for a certain time after the end of clinical 
signs. However, there is an absence of data from well documented outbreaks of pH1N1 in pig herds 
and poultry flocks in which the infection status, clinical symptoms and virus shedding were closely 
monitored in a natural setting with a larger number of animals. Therefore, only limited information 
from a few experimental (infection) studies was available and thus used to address the question in the 
context of this mandate.  
9.1. Summary concerning clinical signs and virus shedding 
9.1.1. Pigs 
Limited temporal association between clinical signs and virus shedding of pH1N1 was reported in 
pigs. While a virus shedding period is rather general, associated clinical signs occur highly variably 
(i.e. until 3 dpi in mild courses, generally until 6-7 dpi but until 8 dpi as the maximum reported; 
Chapter 4.1.2.2). More importantly, however, field data report a substantial number of subclinical 
infections in an infected epidemiological unit (Chapter 4.1.2.1). On the other hand, if other viruses or 
bacteria cause super-/co-infection, the duration of clinical signs may be even further prolonged 
although without causal link to pH1N1 infection or hence to  pH1N1 virus shedding. 
9.1.2. Poultry 
Clinical signs on the individual level are not available. Observable syndromes of pH1N1 infection in 
poultry, which so far have been reported only for breeder turkeys, are a drop in egg production 
(Chapter 4.2.2.1). However, it was reported that when this syndrome started to diminish within 
infected flocks, virus shedding still could be demonstrated (Chapter 4.2.).  
9.2. Evaluation of clinical signs as a predictor for pH1N1 virus shedding 
Since there is a large variability in the duration of clinical signs in pigs and that there is a risk that the 
majority of infected (and potentially infectious) animals will not develop detectable clinical 
symptoms, the following conclusions were reached by expert judgment:  
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– The risk that an epidemiological pig unit infected with pH1N1 can spread the virus after a 
certain period of time without clinical signs of disease is high. 
– The risk that an epidemiological breeder turkey unit infected with pH1N1 will spread the 
virus is low and requires human mediated transmission (handling of the animals during 
artificial insemination). Hence, the risk that the virus is spread from such units after a certain 
period of time without clinical syndrome of disease (egg drop) is low. The evaluation is based 
on the information at the time of writing this report according to which the ability of the virus 
to infect other turkeys via the respiratory route is negligible. 
As a consequence, the recommended waiting period of 7 days between the last observed clinical 
signs/syndromes in an infected epidemiological unit (SANCO/6133/2009-Rev.6) and 
SANCO/6211/2009-Rev.7) is likely too short. However, with the data available so far it is not 
possible to justify any scientifically based alternative waiting period.  
9.3. Conclusions 
– The exploitation of clinical signs as temporal proxy for termination of virus excretion within an 
infected epidemiological unit is not valuable in either pigs or poultry. In these species the duration 
of virus excretion is not consistently associated with the appearance of clinical signs to allow 
epidemiological decision making based on their temporal order of occurrence. In consequence, 
using the time of cessation of clinical signs and a preset time interval at the level of 
epidemiological units to establish clearance from infectiousness (virus shedding) is lacking any 
scientific basis. 
9.4. Recommendations 
– It is not recommended, at present, to restrict animal movement during infectious periods as 
pH1N1 has no more significance for pig health than the presently circulating SIVs. Swine 
influenza is endemic in the majority if not all global pig populations. 
– Clinical signs are not reliable as a basis to decide on the end of an infection with pH1N1 virus in 
an infected herd/flock because pH1N1 induced signs are variable, non-specific or absent. 
Therefore, when the health status in regard to excretion of pH1N1 virus from a farm/flock needs 
to be known, it is recommended to test a number of nasal/oro-pharyngeal swabs (swine) or 
oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs (poultry) according to the expected within herd/flock prevalence 
for pH1N1 virus by a specific pH1N1 PCR. Testing should start 14 days after the diagnosis is 
established and continue at 2 week intervals until no excretion of virus can be demonstrated. In 
pigs, the focus should be on animals of 8-12 weeks of age. 
– Currently it cannot be recommended to use serology to differentiate pH1N1 infection from other 
endemic SIV infections due to cross-reactions when using the available tests.   
– Depending on the evolution of the pH1N1 it could be justifiable to develop serological tests that 
allow differentiation between the circulating SIV subtypes and the pH1N1 virus.  
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10. ToR 5 - To assess the possibility, efficacy and efficiency of vaccination, using existing 
vaccines or newly developed vaccines against pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus, in 
pig and poultry populations also in relation with possible evolution of variants of 
influenza viruses posing a serious risk to public and animal health; 
10.1. Pigs 
Below is a brief assessment of each of the specific questions mentioned in the ToR. The background 
information used to answer these questions can be found under chapter 5 of this document. For 
clarity, vaccination with existing vaccines (10.1.1.1) and vaccination with vaccines based on pH1N1 
virus (10.1.1.2) are treated separately. The terms “possibility”, “efficacy” and “efficiency” are defined 
as follows: 
- “possibility” of vaccination means availability of vaccine 
- “efficacy” of vaccination means according to European Pharmacopoeia the ability of the 
vaccine to offer significant virological protection in an experimental setting, i.e. after a 
double vaccination of influenza naïve pigs and challenge with pH1N1 virus 3 weeks after the 
second vaccination. Virological protection is defined as a significant reduction in virus titres 
in the lungs of vaccinated pigs compared to unvaccinated challenge control pigs. 
- “efficiency” of vaccination means the ability of the vaccine to reduce virus circulation under 
field conditions.  
By “in relation with possible evolution of variants of influenza viruses posing a serious risk to public 
and animal health”, we understand “can vaccination prevent or stimulate the emergence of pH1N1 
variants that are more virulent for pigs or that show increased transmissibility from pigs to humans?” 
This question is also considered separately (10.1.1.3). 
10.1.1. Existing vaccines: 
- Possibility of vaccination: Inactivated vaccines based on the endemic SIVs are commercially 
available in many, but not all European countries. Most vaccines are bivalent and contain 
H1N1 and H3N2 virus strains; one vaccine is trivalent and also includes an H1N2 strain. 
- Efficacy of vaccination: Serological investigations of pigs vaccinated with various existing 
vaccines allow the expectation that these vaccines will reduce pH1N1 virus replication in the 
lungs. This assumption is based on the fact that influenza virus replication in the lungs of 
vaccinated pigs correlates with post-vaccination HI antibody titres against the challenge virus. 
- Efficiency of vaccination: Data about the efficiency of vaccination against the pH1N1 virus 
are lacking. Vaccination with the existing SIV vaccines is voluntary and vaccination rates 
vary in different countries. Voluntary vaccination of swine with these existing vaccines has 
not succeeded in halting the circulation of SIV in the swine population. It is unknown if, and 
to what degree, obligatory SIV vaccination could reduce pH1N1 virus circulation. 
10.1.2. Vaccines based on pH1N1 virus: 
- Possibility of vaccination: A monovalent inactivated vaccine based on pH1N1 for use in pigs 
is available in the US, but not in Europe. Such vaccines can be readily developed based on the 
experience with other SIV vaccines. 
pH1N1 influenza and implications for animal health 
 
 
44 EFSA Journal 2010;8(9):1770 
- Efficacy of vaccination: There are no published efficacy data for the commercial vaccine 
available in the US. An experimental vaccine based on pH1N1 was shown to completely 
prevent virus isolation from nasal swabs and lung lavage fluids upon challenge with pH1N1. 
Other pH1N1 vaccines are therefore expected to confer significant or even complete 
virological and clinical protection, superior to the protection with SIV vaccines already 
authorized in Europe. 
- Efficiency of vaccination: There are no data about the efficiency of widespread vaccination 
with pH1N1 vaccines in pigs in the field. Based on the experience with existing SIV vaccines 
and endemic SIVs, voluntary vaccination is unlikely to halt the circulation of pH1N1 virus in 
the swine population. It is unknown if, and to what degree, obligatory vaccination could 
reduce virus circulation. 
10.1.3. Potential evolution of variants of influenza viruses posing a serious risk to public and 
animal health: 
- Evolution of variants of pH1N1 virus posing a serious risk to animal health: As mentioned 
above, vaccination is unlikely to prevent the spread of pH1N1 in swine populations, 
supposing that pH1N1 virus is or becomes endemic. The emergence of drift variants of 
influenza viruses is unpredictable, but it is unlikely to be prevented by vaccination. In 
addition, it cannot be excluded that vaccination increases the risk for antigenic drift by 
stimulating the circulating virus to escape from neutralization by vaccine-induced antibodies. 
The latter phenomenon, however, has never been observed with the existing vaccines and 
endemic SIVs. 
- Evolution of variants of pH1N1 virus posing a serious risk to human health: For the same 
reasons mentioned above, vaccination is unlikely to prevent the emergence of drift variants of 
pH1N1 virus with increased transmissibility to humans. However, the likely divergent 
evolution of pH1N1 in pigs compared to that in humans makes it unlikely that virus with 
increased transmissibility to humans would evolve. 
10.1.4. Conclusions 
– Immunity resulting from vaccination with existing SIV vaccines on the European market will 
provide some extent of cross-protection against infection with the pH1N1 influenza virus but 
specific pH1N1 vaccines will offer superior protection. Such vaccines will significantly reduce or 
even completely prevent pH1N1 replication and disease in the individual animal. Vaccination will 
not, however, prevent pH1N1 circulation in the population if it is applied on a voluntary basis. 
– Cross-infection studies with the well-known endemic SIVs indicate that prior infection with these 
viruses will confer some cross-protection against infection with the pandemic virus.   
– Vaccines based on the pH1N1 virus appear to induce a protection similar to that induced by the 
existing SIV vaccines against the respective endemic SIVs. Such vaccines are generally highly 
efficient in the prevention of disease caused by influenza viruses because they reduce the extent 
of virus replication in the lungs. Voluntary vaccination of swine with these existing vaccines has 
not succeeded in halting the circulation of SIV in the swine population. 
– At present and according to the available data, the epidemiological situation of pH1N1 in pigs 
does not justify their vaccination with pH1N1 vaccine. Vaccination on a voluntary basis will 
likely protect the vaccinated animals but it will not prevent the spread of the pandemic H1N1 
virus in swine populations.  
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10.1.5. Recommendations 
– Compulsory vaccination cannot be justified, because of the mild course of the infection and 
disease. Similarly, emergency vaccination cannot be justified. 
– There is no urgency for vaccination of pigs against pH1N1 virus. It could be useful, however, to 
have a specific vaccine, based on the pH1N1 virus, in case of change of the epidemiological 
situation of the virus in the pig population. 
10.1.6. Recommendations for future research 
– Experimental cross-protection studies with pH1N1 challenge in pigs infected with the major 
European SIV subtypes, or their combination. Experimental vaccination-challenge studies with 
the existing European SIV vaccines and pH1N1 challenge; the extent of protection should be 
compared with that of a pandemic H1N1 vaccine. 
– Studies of the immune mechanisms mediating heterovariant and heterosubtypic protection 
between influenza viruses in pigs. Detailed comparative studies of the immune response after 
infection with live virus and after vaccination with inactivated vaccines. 
– Studies into the population dynamics of the virus in presence and absence of vaccination in order 
to obtain knowledge on the effect of vaccines on the transmission and spread of the virus. 
10.2. Poultry 
10.2.1. Conclusions 
– Currently, no vaccines against H1 viruses for poultry are available.  
10.2.2. Recommendations 
– At present, there is no need to vaccinate poultry against pH1N1 virus.  
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11. ToR 6 - To assess the role of wildlife, in particular wild boar and wild birds in the 
epidemiology of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus, if any. 
Data available on the presence of pH1N1 in wildlife is scarce.  Only a single case of pH1N1 virus 
infection in two striped skunks in Canada has been documented so far, as described above. No 
detailed collection and analysis of samples from wild boar or other mammalian species have been 
conducted. 
11.1. Conclusions 
– No pH1N1 virus infections have been reported in wild boar. Although expected to be susceptible 
for pH1N1, they are not expected to play any epidemiological role 
– To date no infection with pH1N1 virus of wild birds have been reported despite the many 
surveillance programmes on Influenza viruses that are conducted in wild birds in particular since 
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APPENDICES  
APPENDIX 1- INFLUENZA PH1N1/09 INFECTIONS IN COMPANION REPORTED IN PRO-MED  
Country Date Animal species  Locations (number of animals) 
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EMA Information requested from NCAs 
Austria  
Belgium Several vaccines are authorized in BE: in addition to the centrally authorized RESPIPORC FLU 
3 and GRIPOVAC 3, the following vaccines are authorized in BE: GRIPOVAC en SUVAXYN 
FLU 
Bulgaria No 
Cyprus  - 
Czech Republic Central MA at EMA: Gripovac 3, Respiporc Flu3. National MA Gripork (Laboratorios Hipra, 
S.A. Spain, 97/1274/93-C, immunisation of pigs against swine flu, inactivated vaccine for 
intramuscular injection, Virus influensis typus A(Hsw1N1) OLL inactivatum, Virus influensis 
typus A(Hsw3N2) G inactivatum, Virus influensis typus A (Hsw3N2) SH inactivatum, pigs.) 
Denmark Respiporc Flu3 and Gripovac authorised centrally. 
Estonia  
Finland special license: Gripovac (Merial), centralized procedure: Gripovac and Respiporc Flu 3 
France MA for:MERIAL - GRIPOVAC, AKIPOR FLU, GESKYGRIP FORT DODGE - SUVAXYN 
FLU 3 
Germany DE-PEI: e.g. Respiporc Flu, Respiporc Flu3, Suvaxyn Flu 
Greece yes, Akipor Flu, Griporiffa, Griporc, Gripovac and Geskygrip (+Auj) (all Merial)  
Hungary Only the centrally authorized product(s) is(are) available in Hungary. 
Ireland No national licenses for vaccines against Swine Influenza in IE. Under national legislation, the 
use of vaccines against Swine Influenza are restricted in Ireland. [Restricted: A person cannot 
import, sell, supply or administer to an animal a vaccine that may be used to produce active or 
passive immunity to the disease specified except, under and in accordance with a special licence 
granted by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food].  
Italy IZOVAC SUI-FLU – Inactivated swine influenza  virus H1N1 A/SW/OMS 2899 and H3N2 
A/SW/OMS 3633; IZO s.p.a.; AN: 100025; Pig; s.c.; Reduction of mortality, clinical signs and 
lesions caused by swine influenza 
AKIPOR FLU – (Inactivated) swine influenza antigen H1N1 and H3N3 + Live Aujeszky desease 
virus; Merial Italia s.p.a; AN :102407; Fattening pigs; i.m.; Active immunization against Aujesky 
Desease and swine influenza 
AUJINFLU-SUIVAX – Inactivated swine influenza virus  H1N1 (H/SW/H1N1- A/New 
Jersey/8/76 related) and H3N2 (A/Port Chalmers/1/73 related) + inactivated  Aujeszky desease 
virus; FATRO s.p.a.; AN : 100036; pig; s.c.; Active immunization against Aujesky Desease  and 
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swine influenza viruses 
FLUEN-SUIVAX – Inactivated swine influenza  virus H1N1 (A/SW/H1N1/OMS 2614/84) and 
H3N2 (A/Sw/H3N2-Sw/OMS 3633/84 related); Fatro s.p.a.; AN: 101818; pig; s.c. o i.m.; 
Protection against clinical signs  cauded by H1N1 and H3N2 viruses 
GESKYGRIP – (Inactivated) Swine influenza antigen H1N1(A/NEW JERSEY/76) and 
H3N1(A/port Chalmers/73) + Aujeszky virus sub viral units; Merial Italia s.p.a; AN: 100014; 
pig; i.m.; Active immunization against Aujeszky desease and Swine influenza 
IZOVAC AUJESZKY-FLU – Inactivated swine influenza  H1N1 A/SW/OMS 2899 and H3N2 
A/SW/OMS 3633  + inactivated Aujeszky Desease virus; IZO s.p.a.;AN:  100293; pig; i.m.; 
Prophylaxis of swine influenza  
GRIPOVAC – (Inactivated) Swine influenza antigen H1N1(A/NEW JERSEY/76) and 
H3N1(A/port Chalmers/73) ; Merial Italia s.p.a; AN: 101330; pig; i.m.; Active immunization 
against Swine influenza 
Latvia Not authorized 
Lithuania No vaccine authorised 
Luxembourg  
Malta  
Netherlands Swine Influenza A Virus (subtypes H1N1 and H3N2) vaccines: 
SUVAXYN FLU 3 (REG NL 1919; inactivated vaccine), GRIPOVAC (REG NL 9216; subunit 
vaccine), AKIPOR FLU (REG NL 9244; subunit vaccine, combination with live Aujeszky ), 
SUVAXYN FLU (REG NL 9463; inactivated vaccine) 
Suvaxyn Flu 3 - Fort Dodge (REG NL 1919), Gripovac – Merial (REG NL 9216), REG Akipor 
– Merial (NL 9244), Suvaxyn Flu - Fort Dodge (REG NL 9463)  
Poland None authorised 
Portugal  - 
Romania  - 
Slovakia No vaccine available 
Slovenia no national authorisations 
Spain GRIPORIVEN (IVEN); SUVAXYN FLU (FORT DODGE); GRIPORK (HIPRA); 
SUIPRAVAC-AD/COLI/FLU (HIPRA) 
Sweden Respiporf Flu3, Gripovac 3 
United Kingdom Respiporc Flu 3 and Gripovac 3 recently authorised centrally 
  
Iceland  
Norway No information on any vaccines. 
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DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO EFSA 
Working document on Surveillance, monitoring and control measures for the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
influenza virus   in poultry  
http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/diseases/influenzaAH1N1/docs/pandemic_h1n1_2009_influenza_viru
s_in_poultry.pdf 
Working document on Surveillance/monitoring and control measures for the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
influenza virus in pigs 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/diseases/influenzaAH1N1/docs/surveillance_control_H1N1_in_pigs_
03112009_en.pdf 
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GLOSSARY  
- Zoonosis : any disease or infection which is naturally transmissible from animals to humans 
(From OIE -  Terrestrial Animal Health Code – glossary) 
- Reverse zoonosis: means any infectious disease that can be transmitted  from humans to 
animals 
- Monitoring: intermittent performance and analysis of routine measurements and observations, 
aimed at detecting changes in the environment or health status of a population (From OIE - 
Terrestrial Animal Health Code – glossary) 
- Surveillance: systematic ongoing collection, collation, and analysis of information related to 
animal health and the timely dissemination of information to those who need to know so that 
action can be taken (From OIE -  Terrestrial Animal Health Code – glossary) 
- Horizontal [direct/indirect] transmission: transmission of the infectious agent by excretion 
and either direct (close) contact to susceptible individuals, or by means of a mechanical of 
live “vector” that acts as a transport “vehicle” 
 
 
